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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in ICT Systems at the International 
Hellenic University. The topic of this paper is concentrated on the power grid and how it 
can be modeled when a small group of prosumers exchange electricity among them-
selves.  
First we elaborate how the smart grid 3.0 works and its evolution from the smart grid. 
Here we concentrate on the architecture of the previous versions of the smart grid, as 
well as the role of ICT and renewable sources of energy (solar, wind). Next we explain 
the architecture of the entities of the contemporary smart grid, such as microgrids, virtu-
al power plants, prosumers and transactive energy markets. In the last part of this chap-
ter we explain the energy market, and its evolution from monopolized market to a de-
regulated market. The operation of electricity exchange on a wholesale and retail level is 
explained at this point.  
In chapter 3 we elaborate the prosumer scenario we have developed by first starting with 
describing game theory in general. Next we explain the Shapley value and how we can 
use that model to allow users in our scenario to collaborate among each other and ex-
change electricity for benefits. We propose our solution and explain our findings. Next 
we propose a schematic model of distributing the remaining electricity to the grid by 
using again the Shapley theorem.  
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1 Introduction 
What is the smart grid? There is no one definition about what it is, but there is a certain 
reason why there is a need for it. The emerging technologies and the opportunities they 
give for optimization and automation of the electricity network, gives a good incentive 
for its implementation. The so called third industrial revolution provides for each appli-
ance, business and residence to be able to connect to the grid, in turn allowing users to 
communicate interactively, decide when to plug in their devices depending on what is 
the price per kWh at the given moment, something made possible by real time pricing 
schemes. This will be enabled by big data collection allowing users to make smart deci-
sions about their electricity usage. It will also allow for more renewables to be used for 
electricity generation, using photovoltaic rooftop panels, small windmill parks and with 
the help of batteries and electronic vehicles, store this electricity and use it as needed, 
thus making households and other facilities, producers as well. 
In general we can say that the “Smart Grid is an intelligent system dedicated to ease the 
communication at different levels of the power grid, allow higher control over the sys-
tem, increase energy delivery efficiency and enable electricity generation by prosumers 
at remote locations to be integrated within the existing power grid.” 
The smart grid is a topic developed countries started becoming more and more interest-
ed in at the turn of the 21st century. With the expansion of technology, the ever increas-
ing pollution and global warming issues, the possibility of using renewable ‘clean’ en-
ergy, the obsolescence of the centralized grid (which at the moment is working at its op-
timum, but with the ever increasing electricity demand, population increase and differ-
ent demand during different periods, has become very costly), as well as in some cases, 
the fear of terrorist attack on the grid network, made the world leaders stop and think 
about one of the biggest necessities of the human race. 
We can say that the smart meters are the first step towards a smarter grid, the so called 
Smart Grid 1.0. This is more or less the stage where we are now: smart meters are im-
plemented in houses and businesses, collecting data about their electricity patterns of 
usage, without the need for human interaction with the device as it was before, when 
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there was a need for an utility company employee to come and read the numbers manu-
ally.  
Thesis structure 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the possibility of electricity sharing among us-
ers in a small community. The users’ collaboration is modeled with the Shapley theorem 
in order to fairly distribute benefits.  
In Chapter 2 we elaborate the smart grid – its evolution, including smart grid 1.0 entities 
like smart meters and their role in the seamless communication between generators and 
consumers. The entities of smart grid 2.0 including real time pricing and demand re-
sponse techniques are elaborated to some extent, providing examples of real example 
implementations in the grid. The advanced metering infrastructure together with the 
benefits of its implementation and the types of different loads in the household and 
which of them allow for DR techniques are detailed. Different ways of prosumer pro-
duction from renewable energy sources (solar, wind) are introduced here. In the next 
part we investigate the smart grid entities, including microgrids with distributed genera-
tion, virtual power plants, prosumers with prosumer based architecture as well as the 
transactive energy market and the TeMIX protocol that allows for communication and 
transactive operarions of end devices (electricity users), transport entities and intermedi-
aries. Next the energy market is explained in general, with the whole process of electric-
ity generation, through distribution to usage. The basic architecture is explained, togeth-
er with recommendations for a more reliable transmission to avoid blackouts. A basic 
notion is given on the energy market deregulation, together with examples of how ener-
gy is transacted with. Further insight is given on the wholesale market operation with 
more detailed elaboration of the types of markets and transmission of electricity on this 
level. Next we briefly explain how the retail market operates in deregulated markets, 
together with the enhanced services offered by utilities.  
In Chapter 3 we start by explaining briefly the concept of game theory. Next we go into 
more depth in cooperative games, focusing on the Shapley theorem and the concept of 
the core of a game. Types of players are described briefly. The concepts of game super-
additivity, subadditivity and monotonicity are explained in the next section, followed by 
the concept of the core. Here we give a simple example of a cooperative game, with 
computing the Shapley value and finding the core, if there is one. We see the difference 
between a stable and fair coalition. Next we present the notion of a convex game fol-
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lowed by an example of a convex game. Next we explain more in depth the Shapley 
theorem, derived from the Shapley axioms of symmetry, dummy players and additivity. 
We explain the concept of the grand coalition and present a simple 2 player game and 
how the total benefits are divided fairly among users. In the next part of this chapter we 
explain our proposed scenario of prosumers and how they will be modeled. Each user 
has a consumption level and some also produce electricity from different PV systems 
installed. We state the problem and which users will be modeled. Next we propose the 
algorithm and assume a pseudocode. 
In Chapter 4 we elaborate our results. We do the calculations using the Shapley theo-
rem, finding the Shapley value of each user in the game. We see whether the grand coa-
lition is stable, and if not we form a new stable coalition set. We calculate the new val-
ues for each player and compare our findings. Next we assume each player changes 
consumption levels, while other players have a constant consumption. We have four dif-
ferent consumption changes for each player. We calculate new Shapley values and plot 
them on a graph to compare findings. Next we calculate amount of electricity that is 
more than needed in the society to be sold to the grid. We propose four pricing schemes 
and calculate benefits of players for each scheme. We compare results to find most ben-
eficial one. 
In Chapter 5 we summarize the conclusions of our findings. 
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2 The smart grid 3.0 
2.1  Smart Grid - Introduction 
What is the smart grid? There is no one definition about what it is, but there is a certain 
reason why there is a need for it. The emerging technologies and the opportunities they 
give for optimization and automation of the electricity network, gives a good incentive 
for its implementation. The so called third industrial revolution provides for each appli-
ance, business and residence to be able to connect to the grid, in turn allowing users to 
communicate interactively, decide when to plug in their devices depending on what is 
the price per kWh at the given moment, something made possible by real time pricing 
schemes. This will be enabled by big data collection allowing users to make smart deci-
sions about their electricity usage. It will also allow for more renewables to be used for 
electricity generation, using photovoltaic rooftop panels, small windmill parks and with 
the help of batteries and electronic vehicles, store this electricity and use it as needed, 
thus making households and other facilities, producers as well. 
As it is now possible to share information over the internet, it will be made possible to 
share energy over the internet. As Ethernet inventor Robert Metcalfe said on his Enernet 
tour in 2008: “Over the past 63 years, we met the world needs for cheap and clean in-
formation by building the Internet. Over the next 63 years, we will meet world needs for 
cheap and clean energy by building the Enernet.” With this statement he announced a 
new era, an era of clean and affordable energy, one made possible by exploiting renew-
able electricity resources, located on remote locations closer to the user and intercon-
nected and controlled via the already existing Internet. 
 
The Smart Grid is defined similarly by different governing bodies.  
So, according to the European SmartGrids Technology Platform,[1] “A Smart Grid is an 
electricity network that can intelligently integrate the actions of all users connected to it 
– generators, consumers and those that do both [prosumers] – in order to efficiently 
deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity supplies.” 
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The US Department of Energy [2] states that “A Smart Grid uses digital technology to 
improve reliability, security and efficiency (both economic and energy) of the electric 
system from large generation, through the delivery systems to electricity consumers and 
a growing number of distributed generation and storage resources.” 
 
In UK’s discussion paper from the Department of Energy called “Smarter Grids: The 
opportunity” [3] it is stated that “the principles of a so called ‘smarter’ grid are allow-
ing it to be observable (making it possible to have access to operational indicators at 
LV in real time), controllable (higher possibility for control and optimization of the 
power system), automated (a network with certain level of ‘intelligence’) and fully inte-
grated (new components that are fully interoperable with the existing system as well as 
with new devices)” 
 
In general we can say that the “Smart Grid is an intelligent system dedicated to ease the 
communication at different levels of the power grid, allow higher control over the sys-
tem, increase energy delivery efficiency and enable electricity generation by prosumers 
at remote locations to be integrated within the existing power grid.” 
One of the essential drivers of the development of the smart grid is the Distributed Gen-
eration (DG), meaning that energy is starting to be generated at the very end of the grid, 
rather than at the centralized generators. This in turn gives way from having only a cou-
ple of generation points that can be easily and centrally controlled, to thousands and 
eventually, millions of generation points, which will have to be coordinated in order to 
operate well together. And as energy is not a commodity that can be stored easily, the 
smart grid will allow for seamless exchange of energy among generators/consumers at 
the local level. Another reason is the communication among generators and users. So far 
the communication has been unidirectional, with data from users homes and facilities 
being sent to utilities central stations for demand forecasting and billing purposes. With 
the emergence of the smart grid it will be possible for consumers to communicate 
among themselves, exchange energy over transactive energy markets, receive infor-
mation about electricity prices in real time and make smart decisions about thei con-
sumption patterns based on this information. 
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2.1.1 Smart grid architecture 
 
The general smart grid architecture consists of entities that must exist and function with 
interoperability within the grid in order to achieve results (they are represented below in 
Figure 1 Smart grid architecture): 
- Renewable energy sources - such as solar (solar panels) and wind (wind parks);  
- Smart buildings and households - smart in a way that a user can control and have 
access in real time of every aspect of the energy consumption; 
- Smart meters – meters that aggregate data and give users information about elec-
tricity prices in real time; 
- Electric vehicles – vehicles that run on electricity, are environment friendly and 
can be used for energy storage as well; 
- Energy storage (batteries) – this is needed in order to store electricity that is pro-
duced close to/by the user for later usage in order to increase user comfort; 
- Transmission and distribution network – in order to distribute electricity at larger 
distances and connect millions of production and consumption points; 
- Smart appliances – ones that allow saving electricity 
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Figure 1 Smart grid architecture 
 
2.2 Evolution from Smart Grid 
The smart grid is a topic developed countries started becoming more and more interest-
ed in at the turn of the 21st century. With the expansion of technology, the ever increas-
ing pollution and global warming issues, the possibility of using renewable ‘clean’ en-
ergy, the obsolescence of the centralized grid (which at the moment is working at its op-
timum, but with the ever increasing electricity demand, population increase and differ-
ent demand during different periods, has become very costly), as well as in some cases, 
the fear of terrorist attack on the grid network, made the world leaders stop and think 
about one of the biggest necessities of the human race. 
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2.2.1 Smart Grid 1.0 – Smart Meters 
We can say that the smart meters are the first step towards a smarter grid, the so called 
Smart Grid 1.0 [4]. This is more or less the stage where we are now: smart meters are 
implemented in houses and businesses, collecting data about their electricity patterns of 
usage, without the need for human interaction with the device as it was before, when 
there was a need for an utility company employee to come and read the numbers manu-
ally.  
Invented in 1972 by Theodore Paraskevakos, this technology allowed for utilities to cal-
culate the amount of electricity spent by the consumers, in between billing periods, an 
amount, as stated before, that had to be physically read every month, and then charge 
the customer. With the emergence of the smart meters, every house meter can automati-
cally send to the utility the exact amount of electricity spent on an hourly basis, rather 
than the need for the utility to roughly guess the consumption as it was before. This 
meant knowledge of electricity demand on an hourly bases, allowing them to analyze 
this data and meet better the daily changes in demand, thus increase customer satisfac-
tion and decrease overhead costs. In Figure 2 below we can see the difference in capa-
bilities between the conventional meter and smart meter. While the conventional way of 
metering requires physical collection of usage data, either by collecting it manually of 
with automatic meter reading devices, which even though allow for faster data collec-
tion, require a physical presence. This data is then processed and stored in the database. 
With the usage of smart meters we have a slightly different process. The data is auto-
matically sent on an hourly bases from the home area network, to which the smart meter 
is connected, through a NAN or WAN via a dedicated gateway in order to be stored in 
the database. This data can then be used by energy suppliers, distribution network op-
erators and other emerging service companies. 
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Figure 2 Conventional and smart meter 
But this is only adding a new two way communication layer between the utility and its 
customers. The main purpose of collecting meter data is usually stated, or assumed to 
be, electricity management (such as demand side load management, efficiency consult-
ing, energy savings, customer feedback/display etc.). More likely, data collection occurs 
simply because it can be easily and cheaply done by remote metering technology origi-
nally deployed to reduce meter-reading costs. This means fewer costs for utilities (since 
there is no need for hiring employees to measure data remotely as well as the lack of 
need of maintaining a fleet of vehicles to reach those meters remotely.) 
So far, smart meters have failed to deliver smart grid benefits from a technical point of 
view: the network generally does not provide a full two way communication; the data 
displayed to the customer is usually stale data on a third-party web site, thus making any 
real-time pricing information obsolete; meters are not equipped to implement demand 
response load control. 
Meter networks generally are not true two way communication networks – they are in-
tended for polling meters and not designed to handle in-bound signaling for demand re-
sponse strategies or to communicate with home automation systems, in-house devices or 
smart appliances. Even if meter networks were able to do so, the back software to sup-
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port such applications is not yet available, or is in primitive state of development and 
not standardized. These networks do not provide a fully functional open premises in-
formation gateway to homes. Even if the meters did provide a gateway function, they 
would likely be implementing a top-down centralized control strategy, which in turn is 
the total opposite of distributed generation with the usage of renewables that the concept 
of smart grid puts as the main pillar of its existence.  
As stated in the US Federal energy regulatory commission 2013 staff report [5], a utility 
launched a project in 2012 which allowed customers to automatically send their energy 
usage data directly to third-party providers, via their smart meters, which in turn al-
lowed customers to download a smartphone application in order access data about their 
usage during the previous day. It also allowed them to learn about the impact of their 
energy use, possibility to extract data and make more informed decisions while cutting 
costs as well as receiving tips for saving money from their energy bill. 
With this increase of information available on the usage amounts and patterns provided 
by smart meters, there is an increase in services that utilities have developed for cus-
tomers, such as energy usage reports, mobile software applications which enhances and 
eases communications between utilities and customers, as well as energy management 
software intended to help users cut costs. Some utilities have decided to hire third-party 
software providers to help them develop these applications that help transform raw data 
into knowledge helpful for the customer. These applications can include information to 
users on how to cut costs by changing usage patterns, lower usage of certain high con-
sumption appliances, and alternative rate programs. 
Still, all these options provided by third-party providers, albeit useful for users, do not 
provide them with the information to make instant decisions from real time prices, let 
alone allow for machine to machine communication for automatic smart decisions. The 
availability of pricing and usage information at an instantaneous rate is essential in order 
to be able to implement incentivized demand response and load control schemes. 
In the US, even though smart meters have been installed in many households, the bene-
fits are yet to come. The state regulators [6] are pressuring them to provide the benefits 
they were intended to provide in the first place, which in turn will allow for better cus-
tomer relationships, grid reliability (lowering possibilities of power outage), energy theft 
and bill accuracy.  
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2.2.2 Smart Grid 2.0 – Real time pricing and Demand response 
This is the next stage after Smart Grid 1.0 and smart meters that do not comply with 
their intended usage. This means getting the smart meters to do what they were intended 
to do – provide real-time pricing, which will allow for demand response schemes and 
help smooth peaks of energy demand at certain times of the day and week. This in turn 
will allow users to plan their usage better, cut costs and help make the network more 
reliable due to flattening peak times and thus reducing the possibility of power outages. 
Real time pricing 
This scheme for electricity pricing implies giving information to customers about the 
cost of electricity prices at any given moment, either via their software or by partnering 
with a third-party software provider. This information can be distributed via text mes-
sages, email or a dedicated web site. The electricity prices usually change every 15 
minutes in response to changes in demand, supply and market conditions. The main goal 
of this scheme is allowing users higher control of what they pay for at the end of the 
month, making them aware of how much they pay for what amount of electricity at any 
given moment.  
Compared to the flat pricing model, where the price of electricity is constant over time 
and state regulated, during off-peak times, when electricity usage is low, the real-time 
pricing based scheme provides electricity with considerable lower prices. On the other 
hand, during peak periods, this price tends to be significantly higher. The high differ-
ence in price encourages users so change their usage behavior and incentivizes them to 
lower consumption during peak periods and delay some tasks to be executed during off-
peak periods. 
Some platforms allow for prices to be predicted a day before, while tracking daily 
changes of electricity price and allowing the user to make decisions ahead based on this 
approximation. This way, users can cut costs and plan their electricity usage behavior 
ahead. As we can see in Figure 3 below, prices that are predicted a day before are not 
exactly the same as in real time, a difference due to changing market conditions. This 
pricing scheme allows for prices to change every hour. 
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Figure 3 Real time pricing scheme with a day ahead prediction of electricity prices 
Image source: https://rrtp.comed.com/live-prices/ 
 
Demand Response (DR) 
The US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission defines Demand Response as: 
“Changes in electric usage by demand- side resources from their normal consumption 
patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to incentive pay-
ments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high wholesale market prices 
or when system reliability is jeopardized”.  
DR allows for demand side management by urging users to reduce their usage at times 
of high demands or encouraging them to increase consumption at off-peak times, either 
by setting different electricity prices for different periods or by using government incen-
tives. This management technique has proved itself more cost effective for outages pre-
vention than increasing electricity generation when demand surpasses supply. This is 
because it is more expensive to generate more electricity at peak times by turning on 
more costly electricity plants, than to incentivize users to reduce their demands at set 
times. Another way to use demand response is be encouraging users to use more elec-
tricity at low usage times, thus flattening the electricity demand curve as much as possi-
ble. This encouragement also saves electricity generation costs, since coal plants (which 
are the main source of electricity at the moment) are most cost effective if they work at 
high, almost full capacity. Even if the electricity was generated from a renewable 
source, such as PV panels, there would be an encouragement for users to use more elec-
tricity at peak sun hours, and less during the night, when the generation from this source 
would be zero. 
The electricity supply is with an exponential growth during one day, since it takes time 
for the generator to start and then it reaches its optimum electricity production. The de-
mand on the other side is somewhat variable (see Figure 4), with peak demand during 
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the afternoon. As we can see in Figure 5, depending on the electricity demand (D1 or 
D2), we can have different prices (P1 or P2) which are set for different quantities of 
electricity (Q1 or Q2). By using lower amount of electricity (Q2), the price changes by 
∆P.  
 
Figure 4 Daily usage of electricity 
Image source: http://www.mytruecost.com/news/2013/10/1/daily-email-with-your-
smart-meter-data 
 
 
Figure 5 Electricity demand and supply and how it affects prices 
Image source: http://publish.illinois.edu/incentive-pricing/ 
 
Demand Response benefits 
Demand response has many benefits for both sides of the electricity market. Some of 
them are [8]: 
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- Financial cost cutting – both on the generation and consumption end. From the 
generation point, when high demand periods are smoothened, there is no need 
for them to turn on more generation plants which are very costly by operating 
only during these times. From the customers point, they save money by not pay-
ing the higher price charged during high demand periods. They user load sched-
uling or on site generation in order to relieve load from the grid. The energy 
saved is called negawatt power [7], representing a theoretical amount of energy 
saved. 
- Grid reliability – with shaving peak demand, the grid becomes more reliable and 
stable by avoiding blackouts and equipment damage due to unsynchronized 
equipment and change in frequency and voltage. This allows for the power grid 
to accommodate more requests without the need to build more plants and/or turn 
on plants that generate higher costs (gas, hydro). It also allows for renewable en-
ergy sources, such as wind and solar, to be implemented in the grid more easily, 
since generation from those sources is unreliable itself. 
 
Types of Demand Response 
Demand response can be achieved by using one of these two demand managing tech-
niques: load shedding and direct load control. We will elaborate them to some extent in 
the following section. 
 
a) Load shedding (scheduling) 
One of the ways to respond and manage peak demand is by scheduling loads. This 
means turning of devices at peak times, devices which do not reduce productivity and 
are easy to turn on/off. If the load they are producing is non-critical, the device can be 
turned off for a certain period of time, i.e. during the time of peak demand. This helps 
flatten the demand and lower the chances for outages that can lead to blackouts, some-
thing that happens when the generator is not capable of producing the needed electricity 
to satisfy all customers. Figure 6 shows how the load is flattened by delaying some 
tasks. Usually generating utilities make deals with high consumption industrial custom-
ers to turn off some of their equipment at high peak demand. Moreover, some large in-
dustrial consumers have their own generators on site, so when demand is high, utilities 
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urge them to use their own generators, thus reducing overall demand, without reducing 
their own. In Figure 7 we can see that the load is only delayed, not lowered overall. 
 
Figure 6 Load scheduling management 
Image source: 
http://www.electrical-installation.org/enwiki/Energy_saving_opportunities_-
_Load_management 
 
 
Figure 7 Load scheduling for demand peak shaving 
Image source: Phillip Yeung, Reducing energy costs with peak shaving in industrial en-
vironments, September 2007 
 
Another method of load shedding is with the so called rolling blackout. Rolling black-
outs are intentional outages of some parts of the electricity network, done by the utility 
companies to prevent large outages at high demand times. this is done during different 
periods at different parts of the grid. As a technique it is mostly used in developing 
countries, since in developed countries, electricity delivery is well managed and planned 
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ahead in order to avoid discrepancies between electricity supply and demand. This is 
now further enhanced with the data used from the smart metering devices. 
b) Direct Load Control  
The second demand management technique is direct load control [9], which is based on 
a contract between the power utility company and its customers. According to this con-
tract [10], the company may control the residential appliances’ operation and energy 
consumption remotely during peak hours in order to balance the grid’s power consump-
tion levels. DLC poses privacy concerns for users, however, and it is questionable 
whether customers would give such control to the company willingly. Still customers 
are incentivized to use this method by receiving tariff discount in exchange for the dis-
comfort they might feel.  
Some of the possible options for the privacy concerns is giving access to control only 
few high power and easily delayed appliances; which will require labeling appliances in 
regard of these characteristics. This policy will offer customers a choice between using 
and not using DLC, by offering them some incentive in order to receive permission to 
apply it. 
Before we can create DLC plans by labeling devices according to their power consump-
tion and operation urgency, we must consider whether a device’s operation can be de-
layed or not. A non-schedulable device, such as a light bulb, TV or a PC needs to be op-
erable at any time the customer wants since they are essential for the quality of living. 
On the other hand, a schedulable device can be planned to start operating at a future 
time. Schedulable appliances can be further categorized by whether their operation can 
be paused or not. An interruptible device, such as an air-conditioner, heater or EV bat-
tery, can be paused and re-activated later. Non-interruptible devices, such as washing 
machine and dish washers, need to be operable continuously once started.  
When labeling devices, it should provide information about power consumption, how 
much time does the device operate, what is the preference of the utility company – 
which appliance do they prefer turning off? According to these labels, devices can be 
further classified in different power usage groups. So at peak times, when a load request 
comes to the utility company, they can assess the appliance type according to the label 
and decide whether it will be turned on or it will be put in a queue for latent operation. 
So the request with the lowest power demand and primacy will be served first. The algo-
rithm also allows for appliances labeled non-interruptible to run continuously once 
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turned on. When an operation is over, the appliance is put back in a queue and assigned 
lower priority than appliances not yet served. 
Let’s say a utility company offers a pricing menu for getting access to an AC and 
change the temperature, and p(u;a) = ṗ - au, where ṗ is the regular fixed price, anxn = di-
ag (a1,a2,….,an) is the discount matrix specifying discount parameters ai for each group i, 
unx1 is the controller of temperature and n is the number of groups under control[11]. 
When the AC is cooling, the utility company will raise the temperature at peak times to 
reduce the load, i.e. set the controller at u>0, which in turn gives customers discount rate 
p(u;a), otherwise, they will pay the regular rate ṗ. 
This type of DLC is closely related to thermal comfort. Comfort is a function of the fol-
lowing parameters: a, which is a physical value and µ, which is a threshold value, and 
two time thresholds – Tmin(a,µ) – minimum time required to reduce a hypothetical dis-
comfort metric, a, to the wanted value; and Tmax(a,µ) – time needed for the discomfort 
metric a to reach a maximum threshold, µ [12]. The objective of the utility while using 
DLC is to keep the discomfort level below threshold (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8 Pp is the total load, Bp is the total capacity, M is the number of appliances and Pj is the 
power of appliance j 
 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) 
Advanced metering systems are comprised of state-of-the-art electronic/digital hardware 
and software, which combine interval data measurement with continuously available 
remote communications [13]. These types of systems allow the frequent measurement of 
time based and detailed information to different parties. The whole infrastructure is 
comprised of a measurement and collection device at the customer site, a communica-
tion network between the utility and the customer, as well as management systems and 
data processors at the utility site. We can see the AMI in Figure 9 on one side we have 
data collection (via electric, water or gas meter) at the customer site. On the other side 
we have the utility/third party data reception and management which is made of an AMI 
host that forwards data to a meter data management system. These two sides are con-
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nected via a data transmission network (broadband power line, radio frequency, public 
networks). 
 
 
Figure 9 Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
Image source: https://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20070423091846-EPRI%20-
%20Advanced%20Metering.pdf 
 
AMI Benefits 
A broad categorization of benefits that utilities and customers enjoy by using AMI is: 
- System operation efficiency – by using AMI, there is no need to read meters 
physically anymore, thus reducing the need for manual data collection, entry and 
processing. It also increases data accuracy, easier energy theft detection and bet-
ter outage management. 
- Improved customer service – no need to guess the amount of electricity spent 
monthly, early detection of failure, providing customers with different pricing 
schemes, possibility for DR management techniques, and offering real-time 
based prices which gives more control to the customer, thus saving them money. 
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- Cutting costs – the utility saves by reducing equipment and maintenance cost, 
faster solution of outages as well as no costs connected to vehicles and people 
reading meters manually. 
Types of appliance load  
Demand response techniques and whether they are applicable, depend heavily on the 
type of loads they are to model. Different types of loads are elaborated in the following 
section. 
a) Standard load – these types of loads are closely connected to the quality of liv-
ing and are essential for the operation of the household. Devices like lights and 
TV/PC are easily turned on/off, usually increase the overall load by adding addi-
tional flat power levels and belong to this category of loads. Although easy to 
turn on/off, their load is related to the time of usage, hence usually require power 
in the afternoon and night. Standard loads cannot be controlled by direct load 
control, but the load scheduling technique can be used to incentivize users to 
lower this type of load during peak demand time. 
b) Flexible load – these types of loads are usually connected to heating and cooling 
devices (AC, refrigerator). They are closely related to the physical comfort in-
dex, which represents the margin until which point the load can be reduced 
without disturbing the comfort. This threshold is explained in the DLC section. 
The operation of the AC can be lowered until this discomfort threshold is met. 
For the refrigerator, it is the temperature that still keeps the food cold. 
o Refrigerator operation – this appliance has a cycle of function which al-
lows it to turn on/off by itself. In an hour long cycle, the fridge goes off 
and then again on. It is with a constant load for half an hour and then 
goes off again. When the next cycle starts, the fridge is off for more than 
an hour, and the compressor turns on (which happens because the tem-
perature has risen to the maximum threshold), producing a noticeable 
power spike followed by constant load. We can see the fridge operation 
in Figure 10. The consumption in a cycle is approximately 83 Wh, while 
the daily load of this device is 2kW. The footprint of the fridge is consid-
ered to be periodic, since the on/off cycles of the operation are almost the 
same. In Figure 11 we can see a separate operation cycle. 
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Figure 10 Fridge operation 
Image source: http://www.wired.com/2011/11/power-and-electric-motors/ 
 
Figure 11 Operation of one fridge cycle 
Image source: http://www.wired.com/2011/11/power-and-electric-motors/ 
 
c) Elastic load – these types of loads are related to tasks that can be delayed such as 
washing machines, dish washers and electric vehicles. There is also a comfort 
threshold connected to elastic loads, but unlike thermal thresholds as in flexible 
loads, this comfort threshold is related to time, thus providing a certain deadline 
until when the task has to be finished. The duration of the load is crucial in set-
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ting the maximum starting point of the load. In Figure 12 we can see different 
tasks with different loads and durations scheduled to start at different times, 
which are before the deadline set. Here d is the deadline value, a is the task initi-
ation point, s is the duration of the task and p is the power needed to execute th 
task. 
 
  
Figure 12 Comfort level of elastic loads connected to task deadline 
Image source: G.Koutitas, Lecture notes on Green ICT, International Hellenic 
University, 2013/14 
 
A typical elastic load is considered the operation of a washing machine. This ap-
pliance operates a few days in the month for only a couple of hours, making it 
easy to be delayed and used when electricity demand is overall low. In Figure 13 
we can see its operation. The different spikes and durations of the load is due to 
the different operation states of the machine, such as washing, rinsing, spinning 
etc.  
 
Figure 13 Operation of a washing machine 
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Image source: http://www.stahlke.org/dan/powermeter/ 
This type of operation is considered as multistate, as it has different electricity 
demanding states in one cycle of operation. In this example, the highest spike is 
6kWh, while the whole operation electricity demand is 3kWh. 
 
There are two ways to measure different household loads – intrusive or non-
intrusive load monitoring. 
o Intrusive load monitoring – this is achieved by putting a monitoring de-
vice on each appliance. The results achieved with this method are more 
accurate and the only inaccuracies are the ones from the metering device. 
o Non-intrusive appliance load monitoring (NIALM) – this method in-
cludes one meter that monitors the load of all household appliances for a 
period of time. After that the load is disaggregated and appointed to dif-
ferent types of appliances, using these steps: event detection, clustering 
and classification. By event detection we can see when the appliance load 
started and its duration. After that we cluster the similar appliances into 
groups. Then we classify each group to a type of appliance. In Figure 14 
we can see the disaggregated loads of several household appliances. 
 
Figure 14 Disaggregated loads by using NIALM technique 
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Image source: Batra N., Dutta H., Singh A., INDiC: Improved Non-intrusive 
Load Monitoring Using Load Division and Calibration, IEEE, December 2013 
2.2.3 Prosumer electricity production 
The most popular and developed ways for households and industrial customers to pro-
duce electricity on their own, whether in order to reduce demand at peak times or go to-
tally off the grid, are solar and wind energy production. Using these renewable sources 
of energy generation is a more independent, eco-friendly way of producing electricity. 
Solar panels or small wind parks are installed closely to the consumption point in order 
to reduce distribution costs. 
 
Solar photovoltaic electricity generation systems 
Depending on the number of solar panels in an array and their size, different systems are 
capable of producing different amounts of electricity. As we can see in Figure 15, the 
curve of the PV generation is highest during the day and lowest and non-existent during 
the night. The generation of electricity also depends on the peak sun hours (PHS) the 
area they are installed at has. We can see a comparison of production between two PV 
systems: one has a capacity of 1.5kW with a peak of 1kW and a total of 7.3kWh daily, 
and the other has a capacity of 3kW with a peak of 2.1kW and a total of 14.5kWh daily. 
Generation for this area, i.e. sunrise starts at 7am and stops at 7:30 pm. We have to take 
into consideration that generation from solar panels is different in different periods of 
the day and in different months of the year. The average daily consumption for this par-
ticular household is 20.5kW with a peak of 1.2kWh in the evening hours. Since the gen-
eration and demand don’t meet at certain points, there is a need for storage batteries in 
order to have electricity during the night as well. Also as we can see in both cases daily 
demand surpasses the generation capabilities, so in order to cover the demand there is a 
need of at least a 4.5kW system which produces 21.9kWh daily. Another solution is to 
lower demand to at least the generation point of the PV system. Of course this is only a 
calculation for this particular area for this amount of PSH. The surplus of electricity, if 
there is any, can be sold back to the grid. This so called Solar feed-in tariff is what the 
grid will pay the PV producer for the electricity he exports back to the grid. 
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Figure 15 A graph plotting the electricity consumption of a household and the production capa-
bilities of two different PV systems. 
Image source: http://www.solarchoice.net.au/blog/home-energy-consumption-versus-
solar-pv-generation/ 
 
Wind electricity generation 
Wind parks are made of a group of wind turbines at the same location that produce elec-
tricity. Also, small wind turbines can be mounted on a house for lower generation needs 
such as a single household. The generation of electricity from this renewable source de-
pends on the wind speed and frequency. For a wind turbine to start working there is a 
need of 3.5m/s speed or more. Usually they are installed on top of houses or on higher 
places in order to generate more electricity. There is more wind usually during the night, 
so it is a good complement of PV panels. In Figure 16 we can see the general output of a 
wind turbine. The cut in speed, i.e. the speed needed for any electricity to be produced is 
3.5m/s. The rated output speed is the speed between 12 and 17m/s and what allows the 
wind turbine to operate at its maximum capacity. The power generated at the maximum 
capacity is called the rated power output. The turbines are made in such a manner, that 
when the wind reaches a certain speed, the rotor stops working as to avoid equipment 
damage. This is called a cut-out speed and is usually when the wind reaches a speed of 
over 25m/s. 
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Figure 16 Wind turbine power output 
Image source: http://www.wind-power-program.com/turbine_characteristics.htm 
Since the power output of a wind turbine is a variable dependent on the weather condi-
tions, it is very hard to predict the power output for a particular time. This is the reason 
why in our model we only use PV systems for electricity generation. 
 
2.3 The entities of Smart Grid 3.0 
When transitioning to smart grid 3.0, there is a need for the basic new era entities to be 
present. These entities, such as prosumers, microgrids distributed generation, virtual 
power plants and transactive energy markets are essential for a goal to be achieved, 
which is: distributed generation at the end of the grid, by employing renewable energy 
sources at the household vicinity, islanding generation for better outage control and giv-
ing users more power by allowing them to generate electricity for themselves, and also 
sell to other users or back to the power grid. 
2.3.1 Microgrids 
Microgrids are a group of localized generation or storage centers that operates either on 
its own or is connected to the central power system. These are usually dispersed as dis-
tributed generation centers closer to customers. Until now, the DGs are usually discon-
nected when there is an outage, in order not to damage the network. In some countries, 
DGs act as a backup power in times of outages at the local level [14]. As the microgrids 
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act as a group of DGs, it can be seen as a miniature of a large interconnected grid that 
can provide the demanded power as well as go from islanded mode of operation to in-
terconnected and vice versa [15]. 
Microgrids can operate in island more or import electricity from the grid if necessary. 
Generation resources are usually renewables, such as solar and wind, since they can be 
localized closer to loads and produce smaller amounts of electricity. Multiple distributed 
generation sources and the possibility to isolate the microgrid from the central power 
grid makes this network a highly reliable electricity provider. The microgrid is set to 
remain operational in an autonomous mode after islanding and meet the corresponding 
load requirements [16]. Implementation of microgrids is highly frequent in places where 
blackouts are common due to severe weather conditions and where the central power 
grid is subject to frequent cutouts. 
 
Types of microgrids 
We can further describe the types of microgrids as: 
- Isolated microgrids – microgrids operating autonomously, i.e. not connected to 
the central power grid. 
- Islandable microgrids – this type is fully interconnected and synchronized with 
the centralized power grid, and is capable of producing and consuming electrici-
ty to/from the central grid. It can maintain some level of electricity supply during 
outages. 
In Figure 17 we can see how the microgrid is connected to the utility centers, distributed 
generation points and loads. 
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Figure 17 Microgrid control system 
Image source: http://www.microgridinstitute.org/about-microgrids.html 
 
Island mode – this is when the microgrid is not connected to the utility grid and operates 
on its own. This if only possible if the microgrid’s produced capacity P(t) is equal or 
higher than the sum of the total consumption load c(t) of all the users i in the microgrid 
set M, as expressed in the following formula (Figure 18): 
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Figure 18 Island mode operation condition of microgrid 
 
Microgrid benefits 
Some of the major benefits when implementing distributed generation for microgrids 
are: 
- Transmission and distribution costs – since the generation points are closer to the 
loads, distribution costs are significantly lower. 
- Self-endurance – even if there is an outage, the microgrid users will still have 
power to function without the utility grid. Moreover, the microgrid can supply 
the central power grid with electricity until the outage is repaired. 
- Lower carbon emission – since the energy sources usually used in microgrids are 
renewables, the amount of carbon footprint is significantly lower than from tra-
ditional power plants. 
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- Rural environments – this is a good solution for users who want to consume 
electricity, but cannot connect to the central power grid because it does not reach 
their location. 
 
2.3.2 Virtual Power Plants (VPP) 
Thought often used interchangeably with microgrids, VPPs are more connected to the 
control of generated power from sources that do not necessarily need to be in a proxi-
mate location. By aggregating many small distributed generators into a portfolio, they 
become visible to the system operator who can then control them remotely. The output 
from a set VPP is made to have similar characteristics as a regular generation unit. The 
portfolio of generators in a VPP is classified by the clustering of generators: 
- Geographically proximate generators – the distributed generation centers are ge-
ographically close to each other, which may not be the best portfolio set. If the 
wind turbines are set far away from each other, electricity generation is bound to 
be more continuous, as wind blows at different times in different places. Similar-
ly, the solar panels that are more dispersed, generate more electricity together 
due to changing weather conditions at different places.  
- VPP size – the size can range from small to large depending on the number and 
size of distributed generation centers. The size of DG is usually small, but when 
pulled together, they can be considered as a big enough sources to compete with 
the central power grid. As the number and distance of DGs increases, the need 
for seamless control is higher which will facilitate communication and infor-
mation exchange between system operators and DGs. 
2.3.3 Prosumers 
With the intention of becoming more sustainable, the power grid is heavily exploring 
ways of integrating distributed renewable energy generation points and storage units at 
many levels. Maybe the most obvious integration is at the generation level, where re-
newable sources will supplement and hopefully replace traditional power generation 
sources. Another integration point to be considered is at the distribution level where 
smaller scale renewables generation offer cheaper and more environment friendly op-
tions to customers. In recent years, an integration point located below the distribution 
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level is emerging, allowing users to produce their own electricity [17]. This seams as the 
most logical option, since renewable energy generation is most effective when produced 
In small scale and close to the load. 
Users that have installed distributed generation and energy storage centers, making them 
producers as well consumers, are called prosumers [18]. There are two modes of opera-
tion: 
Prosumer – if p(t)>c(t) 
Consumer – if p(t)<c(t) 
where p(t) is production over time and c(t) is consumption. 
Such generation points are needed with the emergence of the renewable energy sources. 
It allows users that do not have access to the central grid to generate electricity for 
themselves. Another possibility is for prosumers to produce electricity for themselves 
and sell the surplus back to the grid. This is regulated by the feed-in tariffs that are set 
by the utility company.  
Examples of prosumers include a building with an EVs that provide storage services to 
utilities, households that produce electricity and exchange power among themselves or 
sell back to the grid and a microgrid that sells electricity to another microgrid or utility 
when demand is high. 
One of the rising ideas is that it will become cheaper for users to produce electricity than 
to buy it from utilities [19]. The emergence of cheaper solar system equipment and 
abundance of it makes users more confident about producing their own electricity. 
There are some countries that encourage users to produce electricity and sell it back to 
the grid in order to earn some money. Other utilities install solar panels on users houses 
and then sell the electricity at a lower rate than before. There are many ways of going 
about the produced electricity, with one major issue still present: storage. 
When Wes Kennedy started engineering solar systems in mid 90’s he has one integra-
tion option – batteries [20]. Since the emergence of solar systems, the most important 
technology was storage related, since prosumers had to store electricity for later usage. 
With the emergence of policies requiring utilities to connect to prosumers, the need for 
storage has become marginalized. Still, if prosumers decide to operate off-grid, the need 
for storage devices is essential, be it batteries or EVs. In Figure 19 we can see a graph 
showing drastic drop in battery price in the years to come, which is encouragement for 
prosumers that want to operate off the grid.  
  -31- 
 
Figure 19 Battery price projections 
Image source: http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/where-and-when-
customers-may-start-leaving-the-grid  
 
The drop of commercial and residential solar is also promising, with a drop of around 
60% in the recent years. 
One of the key characteristics of prosumers is that they assume different roles at differ-
ent times: at one moment they could be producers at other they are consumers. The con-
trol architecture based around prosumers is different than the one that operates now. The 
prosumers based architecture takes proactive and distributed control instead of waiting 
for centralized hierarchical control. 
Traditionally, energy flow has been one way, in bulk from the generation point through 
transmission and distribution lines to the consumers. With the emergence of DG and 
prosumers, the need for a different design that allows for electricity to flow bi-
directionally at distribution level is essential. Prosumers are economically motivated to 
produce and store electricity, to operate a power grid and transport electricity, and be 
motivated to change usage behavior in order to sell excess to utility companies or resi-
dential and commercial users. We can see the concept of a prosumer in Figure 20, which 
can represent a household, a certain device powering on solar charger, a utility compa-
ny, industrial facility or a commercial building. Prosumers can produce, store, buy or 
sell electricity as needed. 
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Figure 20 Concept of prosumer 
Image source: 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5759167&url=http%3A%2F%2
Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fxpls%2Fabs_all.jsp%3Farnumber%3D5759167 
 
Prosumer based architecture 
In order for prosumers to interact among each other or with consumers or utilities, there 
is a need for a layered architecture [21]. Each of the control layers provides a more in-
telligent mechanism for grid control. In Figure 21 we can see the prosumer based archi-
tecture, made of 4 layers. 
 
Figure 21 Prosumer based architecture 
Image source: 
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http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5759167&url=http%3A%2F%2
Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fxpls%2Fabs_all.jsp%3Farnumber%3D5759167 
a) Device layer – represents the physical connectivity of electric components. 
b) Local control layer – the control mechanism of devices such as the battery 
charger of an EV. It can include electromechanical, power electronic and soft-
ware components. It is capable of acting based on local information and must 
provide interfaces in order to interact with the system control layer. 
c) System control layer – provides the control needed to meet the functional and 
performance system level objectives, such as volt-var regulation, economic and 
secure operation, system restoration, loss minimization etc. It uses applications 
like state estimators in order to monitor system state. The EMS and DMS appli-
cations of electric utilities are an example of system control layer. 
d) Market layer – this layer decisions are updated by the previous layer according 
to system constraints. It uses this information and uses advanced economic and 
financial applications such as location marginal pricing calculation, risk man-
agement, load and price forecasting etc., in order to generate control actions for 
the layers below it or price signals for the electricity users. 
2.3.4 Transactive energy 
Transactive energy is defined as “a means of using economic signals or incentives to 
engage all the intelligent devices in the power grid – from the consumer to the transmis-
sion system – to get a more optimal allocation of resources and engage demand in ways 
we haven’t been able to before”[22]. As stated before, this translates into the distribu-
tion system becoming a bi-directional system connecting resources like DR and house-
hold prosumers and allowing load management. In Figure 22 we can see the transactive 
energy market, where microgrids can be connected to the central grid, residential cus-
tomers can produce and store electricity, EVs can be connected to the retail market, and 
all this for the sole purpose of electricity exchange and storage. 
-34- 
 
Figure 22 Transactive energy markets 
Image source: http://www.pointview.com/data/files/2/1062/1878.pdf 
 
The TeMIX protocol developed enables high speed, high volume information exchange 
for electric energy transactions [23]. The protocol developed facilitates the process of 
negotiation, contracting and delivery of electricity between parties. Generators and 
consumers can both take the roles of buyers or sellers on the market. Figure 23 shows 
how different parties such as generators, traders, customers, retailers, transmission and 
distribution providers, can transact via the TeMIX protocol network. Communications 
involve a series of priced offers that lead to a transaction. 
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Figure 23 TeMIX network 
Image source: http://www.pointview.com/data/files/2/1062/1878.pdf 
 
TeMIX operations 
The protocol described before allows for decentralized decisions and coordination of 
price offerings among different parties. Transactive operations for different players are 
different and are explained below. 
a) End device transactive operations – each device that produces, consumers or 
stores energy (renewable energy generator, home appliance, EV) is considered 
an end device. In Figure 24 we can see the operation of these end devices. The 
control interface has three functions: to determine the device’s optimal operating 
level, receive and make optimal priced offers and enter into optimal transactions. 
 
Figure 24 End device transactive operations 
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b) Transport transactive operations – companies that provide transmission and dis-
tribution services fall into this category. In Figure 25 it is shown the transport 
transactive operations, where we can see that the primary of optimization for 
transport products is to determine the priced offers to other parties and determine 
which offers to accept. A transport operator can also choose to buy electricity at 
one location and sell at other location, as well as offer a price to transport elec-
tricity between two locations. 
 
Figure 25 Transport transactive operations 
 
c) Intermediary transactive operations – parties such as brokers, marketers, retail-
ers that have portfolios of energy and transport products for third parties fall into 
this category. Figure 26 shows the intermediaries transactive operations, which 
includes intermediary services between buyers and sellers. 
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Figure 26 Intermediary transactive operations 
 
2.4 The energy market 
Energy markets are places where interested parties meet to trade with different kinds of 
energy. The energy market had a traditional way of generation and distribution, usually 
there was one company, private or public, and that generates and distributes energy to 
the end users. The government gave a monopoly franchise to this company, allowing it 
to be vertically integrated and be responsible for the whole process, from beginning to 
end. The process of generating and delivering electricity to the end users is the follow-
ing [24]: 
a) Generation (power plants and generators) – the production of the electric energy 
by transforming other forms of energy, be it coal, atomic fusion, wind or solar, 
into electric energy. The generators size can be from the one of washing machine 
to building size, but the bigger and newer it is, the cheaper is for the electricity to 
be produced. At this level the electricity is at medium voltage, up to 22kV. 
b) Transmission (transmission lines, transmission stations) – the process of trans-
mitting big amounts of energy at large distances, from power plants to substa-
tions located near the demand centers. This is because power plants are located 
in rural environment, and electricity is needed in the urban environment the 
most. Transmission level voltage (HV) is considered to be usually from 140kV 
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up to 765kV. The voltage depends of the amount of electricity that needs to be 
transferred to the distribution substations. 
c) Distribution (substations, consumers, active transformers) – delivery of electrici-
ty from transmission centers to individual consumers. At this level (MV), the 
voltage is lower and is usually less than 33kV. The voltage is further lowered at 
consumer level, which is usually from 100V to 250V, depending on the country. 
d) Retail (prices, meters) – the prices are calculated by the price per kWh and the 
number of Kwh spent during a period of one month. The meters installed in 
households or other facilities are used to measure the amount of electricity spent 
by the consumer each month. 
 
Figure 27 shows how the electricity is transmitted and distributed from generation 
point to the different customers, with the different voltages on each level. 
 
 
Figure 27 Electricity transmission and distribution scheme 
Image source: http://energy.org/cat00040870.html 
 
Reliable operation of the power grid is complex and demanding for two fundamental 
reasons [25]: 
- First, electricity flows at close to the speed of light (186,000 miles per second or 
297,600 km/sec) and is not economically storable in large quantities. Therefore 
electricity must be produced the instant it is used. 
- Second, without the use of control devices too expensive for general use, the 
flow of alternating current (AC) electricity cannot be controlled like a liquid or 
gas by opening or closing a valve in a pipe, or switched like calls over a long 
distance telephone network. Electricity flows freely along all available paths 
from the generators to the loads in accordance with the laws of physics—
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dividing among all connected flow paths in the network, in inverse proportion to 
the impedance (resistance plus reactance) on each path. 
Maintaining reliability is a complex enterprise that requires trained and skilled opera-
tors, sophisticated computers and communications, and careful planning and design. 
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and its ten Regional Reliabil-
ity Councils have developed system operating and planning standards for ensuring the 
reliability of a transmission grid that are based on seven key concepts: 
- Balance power generations and demand continuously – electricity generation 
must be constantly fine-tuned in order to me the ever changing demand. The 
demand is predictable to some extent, with a daily curve that peaks in the after-
noon and evening, and higher during weekdays than weekends. If generation 
fails to match demand, the frequency of an AC power system increases when 
generation is higher or decreases when demand is higher. Small variations of 
frequencies are normal and do not influence the system much, but large changes 
in frequencies lead to equipment damage. In extreme cases, the system imple-
ments automatic load shedding, forcing rolling blackouts in order to prevent the 
whole system to collapse. 
- Balance reactive power supply and demand to maintain scheduled voltages – the 
generator produces two types of electricity: real and reactive, both necessary and 
balanced. The real power is the one that powers equipment and is measured in 
watts. Reactive power is the energy supplied to create or be stored in electric or 
magnetic fields in and around the electrical equipment. This power is measured 
in volt-ampere reactive – VAr and is important for equipment that relies on 
magnetic fields for functioning (pumps, AC, motors). If reactive power cannot 
be supplied when needed and in needed quantity, in extreme cases there can be a 
voltage collapse. This is why reactive power sources are needed to maintain 
voltage levels. Low voltage can result in system instability and shutdown, while 
high voltage can damage lines insulation and cause flashovers. 
- Monitor flows over transmission lines and other facilities to ensure that thermal 
limits are not exceeded – since electricity flows freely across all connected cir-
cuits, the power flow changes constantly on distribution and transmission lines. 
All equipment that carries electricity is heated by its flow, thus raising the need 
to limit the flow in order to prevent overheating which can lead to damaging 
equipment. The overhead lines are particularly monitored to prevent overheat-
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ing, since the metal can stretch and allow the lines to sag, thus increasing the risk 
of causing fires or damaging equipment. 
- Keep the system in a stable condition – stability problems can develop very 
quickly – in a matter of seconds. This is why stability limits are imposed in order 
to prevent system collapse. Voltage stability limits that prevent voltage levels to 
drop. Power stability limits are set in order not to lose synchronization between 
generators and loads when there is an unplanned loss of line or shortage. 
- Operate the system so that it remains in a reliable condition even if a contingen-
cy occurs, such as the loss of a key generator or transmission facility – this 
means the system must be operated in a preventive more so that when the most 
important generator or transmission facility fails, the remaining facilities can 
continue operating. 
- Plan, design and maintain the system to operate reliably – short term planning 
for daily and weekly operations and long term planning for providing generation 
resources and transmission capacity are both needed to provide system reliabil-
ity. A utility should also predict future loads in order to arrange sources to meet 
demand. 
- Prepare for emergencies – for rare events, such as severe weather conditions, 
emergency procedure have to be developed and operators must be trained to rec-
ognize and take corrective actions. 
 
One of the big advantages of this vertically integrated system was the ability to exploit 
economies of scale, which meant that the more electricity produced; the cheaper the 
price is per unit. On the other hand, this company is responsible to deliver electricity to 
all consumers in the country, no matter where they are located and whether it is viable 
for the company to deliver the electricity per unit price. Figure 28 shows the vertically 
integrated market as it was, and still is in some economies [24]. There is one company 
providing all electricity related transaction services: from generation to delivery and 
billing the customer. They use the income to cover costs and the remaining is the profit 
they gain. 
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Figure 28 Traditional vertically integrated, regulated company for generating and distributing 
electricity to its customers. 
 
The traditional way of producing and selling electricity proved to be unfit for the needs 
of people in the 21st century. It was seen as viable for the electricity industry a century 
ago, but now it seems like this model is suffocating service innovation. 
Today, in developed countries, there is a tendency for electricity market liberalization. 
This liberalization was being imposed in the hope that it will increase competition 
among companies, thus lower electricity price. The developed countries were striving 
towards it, claiming it will be better for society and consumers. The underdeveloped and 
countries in development, opted for this liberalization in the hope to attract foreign in-
vestments by selling public electricity companies. Still there are a lot of developed 
countries who have not yet adopted this liberalization, because they want to see how it 
will work out and the advantages from it. Even in countries with liberated electricity 
markets, it is not fully implemented, if ever. 
The original concept of the liberated electricity market was in light with competition; 
different companies at generation and retail level competing in the market. There is still 
a vertical integration at the transmission and distribution level, although regulated by the 
government, since there is no need to double the infrastructure needed to deliver elec-
tricity from power plants to end users. Figure 29 explains the envisioned process from 
generating the energy to getting it to the final customer. The basic idea of a liberated 
energy market is: competition at wholesale (generation) and retail (service) level, while 
the transmission and distribution are still vertically integrated, owned by one company 
and regulated by the government.  
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With this competition at wholesale and retail levels, the innovation would be encour-
aged, allowing for better customer service by lowering costs with higher market shares 
and profits. 
 
 
Figure 29 Envisioned de-monopolizing of electricity companies 
 
In reality, the situation was different. In some countries the model developed was very 
similar to the one in Figure 28, but for the most part the liberalization of the energy 
market took a slightly different direction. Figure 30 depicts this process for better under-
standing.  
This model depicts the liberalization closer to the one deployed: the monopolized com-
panies from the traditional market become Local Distribution Companies (LDC), with 
the right to only distribute and sell electricity to end consumers. The generation of elec-
tric energy can be done by anyone with the will and finance to do so. The difference be-
tween the imagined and deployed model is that in the deployed liberalization there is no 
competition at retail level, and the monopolized company from the traditional market 
still makes profit from selling electricity to end users, rather than from giving transmis-
sion and distribution services, as was envisioned before.  
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Figure 30 Deregulated market with competing generation companies, transmission is independ-
ent and distribution and retail is still monopolized 
 
Figure 31 depicts what really happened with the liberalization of the energy market: 
characteristic structure of the liberalization as deployed, showing 3 formerly vertically 
integrated companies for generation and distribution, now big LDCs. Their previous 
production departments are now independent competing companies, with a new, fourth 
generation company. The transmission networks, formerly owned by these vertically 
integrated companies are now connected together in a regional network and regulated by 
a third independent party – Independent System Operator (ISO). 
 
Figure 31 Electricity market after liberalization 
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In this model, the production companies are competing in the market, and where either a 
part of a former vertically integrated electricity companies, or completely new formed 
companies. The transmission system is no longer controlled by the vertically integrated 
companies, but from and independent ISO. These companies were forced to either sell 
their transmission lines or rent them to the companies operating them now. The former 
integrated companies are now only responsible for distribution and selling of electricity 
to end users, one they buy from the competing production companies. 
In the following sections we will see more in depth how the market works at wholesale 
and retail level, transformation of energy from HV to MV, and then further from MV to 
LV, as well as the possibilities of buying directly from generators and real time pricing. 
 
2.4.1 Wholesale market operation 
The wholesale end of the industry with the liberalization of the electric energy market, 
works in a competitive model: there are many producers of electricity trying to sell it to 
the retailers [24]. This is possible by using one or more from the three possible mecha-
nisms: Electricity markets, bilateral trading and/or electricity brokers. 
- Electricity markets – this market functions similarly to the stock exchange, there 
are offers and bidders who want to buy/sell electric energy. The generators state 
the amount of watts and the price per KWh or the retailers state how many watts 
they need and the price they are willing to pay per KWh. The market regulates 
the price as the supply and demand change. Buyers and sellers do not know the 
identity of the other, or whether the electricity they bought/sold was from/for 
one party or several. One of the major differences of the electricity market from 
the stock market is that both parties need to state the availability of electricity 
they provide/need (for example, I can produce 100MW from 12 to 15 pm tomor-
row). Depending on the regulations, electricity can be exchanged only through 
the electricity market, while other governments allow companies to make trans-
actions through bilateral trading. 
- Bilateral trading – this type of trading represents direct exchange of electricity 
between sellers and buyers. In this case, the identities of both sellers and buyers 
are known and they communicate directly. One of the main advantages with this 
exchange, compared to the electricity markets, is that the transaction is flexible, 
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meaning the period when the electricity is spent as well as the amount is varia-
ble. This can be a huge advantage, in the sense that buyers cannot predict de-
mand at all times. These agreements can be for a year upfront, but vary in differ-
ent periods, according to the agreement and convenience of both sides. Another 
advantage can be the price, which can be lower than the one traded over the elec-
tricity market. Even so, in most regulatory structures, these types of agreements 
are not allowed, or even if they are the details of the agreement have to be made 
public and are a subject to veto from the ISO. 
- Electricity brokers – these types of brokers make bilateral agreements with 
wholesale companies for a certain amount of MW in the following year, which 
they resell to retailers at a higher price. If there is any excess of energy, the bro-
ker can always resell this electricity at the electricity market, as well as buy 
some electricity from the market if the demand from the retailers is higher than 
the one they have at the moment. 
Another difference among markets is whether the retail customers are allowed to state 
the price they are willing to pay for a certain amount of electricity or they can only 
choose from the offered prices and amounts. In the first case, every retailer states how 
many watts they need, at what time and what is the price they are willing to pay for it, 
and wholesale companies send their offers, the one with the lowest price wins. This is a 
model called a reverse auction, where there is one buyer with multiple sellers trying to 
make a transaction. The other model is when the wholesale companies make their offers 
and the buyer can only choose from those offers, regardless their imagined price per 
watt, amount or availability. The prices are somewhat regulated by the government, so 
there will always be some average price to be guided by. In the first case, the wholesale 
market is more competitive, since the buyer has more power than in the second case. 
But this is not always the best choice, because if the system becomes too competitive, 
the small buyers can be left out of the market. Moreover, it makes the market very com-
plicated and even more difficult to be regulated by the ISO. 
A different aspect to be considered is whether the generating companies sell energy, ca-
pacity or both. Selling the first only means that they sell the energy at a lower price, but 
they don’t guarantee availability at all times. If there is another retailer willing to pay 
more for this electricity, they will sell it to them. Selling capacity means availability at 
all times. They do not actually sell electricity, but if a retail company needs some 
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amount of electricity at certain times, because of an outage or some other fault that their 
regular provider has, the company is under contract to provide the needed electricity to 
the retailer. This type of contract is called a reserve contract, and there is a transfer of 
energy only at certain times. If the wholesale company is selling both, that means that 
they provide electricity at all times, without shortages at certain times. Depending on the 
agreement the producer and buyer have, we have different types of contracts: stable, re-
serve, discontinued or no contract. These options are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Different types of contracts depending on transaction of capacity and/or energy 
     Buying energy? 
 Yes No 
Stable contract Reserve contract 
Discontinued 
contract 
No contract 
 
Electricity transmission on a wholesale level 
In order to get the electricity from the generators to the buyers, there is a need for an 
electricity network that will distribute it to the wanted location. As was mentioned be-
fore, this is usually regulated by an independent system operator. Before the deregula-
tion of the market, every company owned their transmission lines. At the middle of the 
previous century, companies realized it was better to pool their resources and share the 
transmission lines because they will reduce costs and be able to grow the transmission 
capacity. This way they used the transmission lines together, and if there was an outage, 
they always had another line to use until the broken one was fixed. With the market de-
regulated, the transmission lines are again controlled by one party – the ISO – and offer 
services to the generators and buyers to make the transfer of electricity needed. This in-
dependent system operator does not own the transmission network, rather it operates it. 
The ownership of this network is of the government or as it was before the liberaliza-
tion, it is owned by the formerly vertically integrated companies, now LDCs.  
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Regardless of the ownership of the transmission lines, they have to provide the follow-
ing services to the market: 
- System security – no matter who controls the transmission lines, they have to 
provide electricity flow and reduce the capacity outages at a minimum. In the de-
regulated market this becomes a little more complicated since there are more 
sellers and buyers, which makes the system more unpredictable. 
- Electric energy delivery – the transmission system is there for one purpose only: 
to coordinate and make sure the sold/bought electricity is delivered. 
- Covering costs – for lending its services to the sellers/buyers of electricity, the 
system has to charge them in order to cover the costs of electricity transmission.  
- Fair electricity transmission market – the operator has to ensure that the lines are 
used fairly to transmit electricity to the competing buyers. Usually this is 
achieved on a first buy, first serve basis, which allows the participants to reserve 
the lines in a certain period of time. 
2.4.2 Retail energy market 
In deregulated markets, the electricity retailers are the ones selling electricity to the end 
users, except for factories and large institutions, which can continue buying electricity at 
a wholesale level. The way retailer will compete in this market is very similar to the 
way phone operators compete, with competitive service plans, advertising, improved 
technology and customer care, all with the lowest possible prices. The end-use custom-
ers range from large manufacturing facilities to household users [24]. 
In markets where retail is fully deregulated, customers can choose to stay with the in-
cumbent facility, or choose one of the new companies competing at the retail level, as 
opposed to the monopolized markets where the only choice customers had is either buy 
electricity from the one provider, or go off grid, which can be a very expensive invest-
ment, especially for individual households. Usually market liberalization translates into 
lower prices for end users, but sometimes it can result in higher prices for households 
and small businesses. 
The main responsibilities of retail companies are: 
- Buy electricity on a wholesale level in large quantities and distribute it through 
the transmission networks. 
- Transmit smaller amounts of electricity through the distribution network 
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- Sell electricity to the end-user customers 
- Customer management (call center) 
 
Retail companies usually provide fixed prices to their customers, while baring the risk 
of changing wholesale prices themselves. The electricity prices can be somewhat market 
regulated or real time pricing. Even if the prices are not regulated, retail companies are 
motivated to provide lower prices to their customers; otherwise they will be pushed out 
by other companies with more competitive prices. On the other hand, real time pricing 
allows users to take full control of what they pay each month: by knowing the prices 
each hour of the day, they can decide when to use more electricity and when to lower 
their consumption. With this so called demand response, the peak traffic can be lowered, 
lowering costs for retail companies, thus lower costs for end users.  
 
Enhancing retail level services 
Since the lower the price, the more competitive the retail company is, it leaves them 
lower profit margins, thus lower profit. In response, they will offer services that will al-
low them to increase prices and still be acceptable to end users, and this will range from 
basic “economical” packets for electricity services to first class level of service which 
are superior to anything offered on the market, thus most expensive. With this differ-
ence in service they can achieve the following: 
- Difference in product – their electricity can be the same as the one from other re-
tailers, but their services are quite different 
- Profit – their first class packets will allow them to generate higher profit mar-
gins, sometimes up to 100% higher. 
 
There are a lot of special services, which are potentially very useful, that the retail com-
pany can offer, and can provide high values for the customer. Some of them are the 
following: 
- Flexible user service – some of the users may be satisfied with the basic services 
a retailer will provide, but for some users 24/7 services are crucial for their busi-
ness, thus the necessity for flexible user packets with different services. 
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- Selling final products – some retail companies may offer directly some final ser-
vices, such as heating and cooling. 
- Enhanced customer services – competition makes companies more customer 
friendly, including aspects as communication, bill delivery, complaints pro-
cessing and payment. 
- Backup power – there is a range of possibilities to provide electricity in events of 
a blackout, ranging from powering only one computer, to the whole facility for 
up to four weeks. 
- Automation and control – this includes “intelligent” control of high voltage ap-
pliances, such as meters and AC, which allows for more precise control than 
what was used in the 80’s. 
 
Real time based pricing 
Real time pricing implies giving information to end users about the cost of price at any 
given time. This information is usually distributed via email, text messages, phone or 
online. The electricity tariffs usually change every 15 minutes in respect to demand, 
supply and market conditions. While during off-peak periods, prices tend to be much 
lower in this scheme compared to flat-based pricing, during peak periods tariffs are sig-
nificantly higher. Still, this scheme is effective in incentivizing customers to shape their 
electricity demand according to the prices. This is usually done with demand response 
schemes, earlier explained in part 2.2.2.  
 
3 Prosumer cooperation 
3.1 Game theory 
Game theory is a study of strategic decision making. It models conflict and cooperation 
among intelligent decision makers. One type of games is the cooperative game, where 
players collaborate to achieve a greater outcome which is higher than their individual 
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gains. The Shapley theory in particular gives a way to divide this total gains to each 
player of the game, respectively, depending on their contribution to the game. 
 
3.1.1 Cooperative games 
 
Game theory is divided into two branches: cooperative and non-cooperative theory [27]. 
These branches differ in the level of individuality of players in the game. In non-
cooperative theory, the game is detailed and shows all the moves a player can make. In 
cooperative theory, on the other hand, the focus is on the outcome of the game which is 
a shared benefit of the players resulting from their cooperation. 
Cooperative or coalitional games are the type of games where the players cooperate 
among each other to get better results, as opposed to non-cooperative games, when eve-
ryone plays for their own benefit only. The logic behind this cooperation is that if each 
player played by themselves, they would get some value when the game is finished. But 
if they join together, i.e. make a coalition, they can gain more, thus receive greater bene-
fits, or lower costs. This is usually done in politics, when opposing parties join together 
to gain greater benefits, than the ones they would achieve by themselves. With this in 
mind, we can assume that the players making the coalition are not always with same in-
terests or contribute the same value to provide the combined benefit. Also, some coali-
tions cannot be made without some players, while other players are easily replaceable or 
add no benefit when added in the coalition. Unlike non-cooperative games, which focus 
mainly on distributing individual payoffs to players, cooperative games focus on what 
the players as a group can achieve together rather than individually. These benefits then 
can be redistributed among the players, depending on different traits each player has. 
Depending on the different value each player contributes, they expect to receive a pro-
portional benefit from set coalition. There are players that are vital for the coalition it-
self to exist. These players are called the core of the coalition. 
A cooperative game consists of two elements: (a) a set of players and (b) a characteristic 
function specifying the value created by different subsets of the players in the game. 
Formally, let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the (finite) set of players, and let i, where i runs from 
1 through n, index the different members of N. The characteristic function is a function, 
denoted v, which associates with every subset S of N, a number, denoted v(S). The 
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number v(S) is interpreted as the value created when the members of S come together 
and interact. In sum, a cooperative game is a pair (N, v), where N is a finite set and v is 
a function mapping subsets of N to numbers. 
Or in other words [28]: a coalitional game with transferable utility is a pair (N,v), where: 
- N is a finite set of players, indexed by i (i being each individual player of the N 
set); and 
- v: 2N → associates with each coalition S⊆N a real-valued payoff v(S) that the 
coalition’s members can distribute among themselves. We assume that v(Ø) = 0. 
for every coalition (S) that can be made from the number of players i that belong 
to the finite set N, up to the total number of the set N there is a payoff v that can 
after be distributed among the coalition members. Also, we can make the as-
sumptions that the value of the empty set to be 0. A coalitional game can also be 
defined with a characteristic cost function, where c: 2N → and assume that 
c(Ø)=0. This function represents the cost of each player when they form a coali-
tion to perform some task. This is also known as a cost game. Characteristic 
functions are assumed to be superaditive, a notion explained later in this section.  
 
Among the main questions when using coalitional game theory are: 
- Which coalition to form? 
- How should the chosen coalition divide its payoffs among the members 
 
A grand coalition is formed if all the players make a set together. But sometimes this is 
not profitable. Instead it is better for some players to from coalitions with others, mak-
ing a set of coalitions. Once they are made, they can decide on distributing the total val-
ue that the given coalitions get. The counter-coalition of the grand coalition is called an 
empty coalition, as it contains no players. If a coalition consists of a number of players 
less than the total number of players, it is called a proper subset. If the coalition is made 
out of one player, it is called a “singleton coalition” [29]. The allocation of the benefits 
is what each player gets after the end of the game. An allocation is inefficient if there is 
at least one person who can do better, while no other person is worse off. That makes 
sense – if somebody can do better without anyone else being made worse off, then there 
is an unrealized potential for benefits in the game. Conversely, the allocation is efficient 
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in the Pareto efficiency sense if no-one can be made better off without making someone 
else worse off. Let say that members of coalition S get payoff v. Suppose that the mem-
bers of coalition S can join another coalition, S’, and get and allocation of payoffs v’. 
These members that choose another coalition are called defectors. This happens when 
set members get greater payoffs in coalition S’ than they would get in the primary coali-
tion, i.e. v’>v. In this case, payoff v’ “dominates” v through coalition S’. 
 
Types of players in cooperative game theory 
Depending on what they contribute, their bargaining power ad value in general, players 
can be regular, dummy or veto players. 
- - Regular players – players that contribute to the coalition and thus expect some 
payoff as a result, but are not essential for forming a coalition 
- Dummy players – players that when added to the coalition don’t contribute any 
value, but are still valuable as a player in the coalition. Thus, as an investment 
towards good relations, they get some of the payoff when the game is finished 
- Veto player – this type of player is essential for a coalition to exist. For example 
if there are 5 members that can make coalitions, and they need majority to pro-
duce some result, as well as one veto player, the coalition made of 3 members 
has to contain the veto player as well, since this player can veto the proposition 
even if there is a coalition of 3 regular members making the majority in the 
game. This may be a player that does not produce any or much value to the coa-
lition, but the setting of the game can allow big power to this player, thus mak-
ing him essential to the winning coalition and entitled to a share from the payoff. 
 
Supperadditivity, subadditivity and monotonicity 
Characteristic functions are often assumed to be supperadditive, subadditive or mono-
tone [30].  
- Supperadditivity – a game is superadditive if the value of the coalition is equal or 
bigger than the sum of values the players would get on their own. So, a game 
G=(N,v) is superadditive if S and T are disjoint coalitions (S∩T=∅), and 
v(S∪T)≥v(S)+v(T) for all S,T⊆N where v(S∪T) is the value (payoff) of the coali-
tion, v(S) and v(T) are the values of the individual players. 
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- Subadditivity – a game is subadditive when the coalition value is lower than the 
sum of the separate players’ value. This is usually good when the value itself 
represents cost, so it is good to have lower “value” or cost when making a coali-
tion. So a game G=(N,v) is subadditive if S and T are disjoint coalitions 
(S∩T=∅), and v(S∪T)≤v(S)+v(T) for all S,T⊆N 
- Monotonicity - This means that larger coalitions gain more value. A coalition T 
that is larger than coalition S, produces higher values, S⊆T→v(S)≤v(T). This 
theorem stands when there is superadditivity, which makes a larger coalition 
have higher payoffs than smaller coalition. From this we can imply that the 
grand coalition (consisting of all players) has the highest payoff, and thus, value. 
 
The core 
The core is a coalitional game theory solution type. Here we talk more about the stabil-
ity of a coalition, rather than fairness of distribution of payoffs [31]. We see whether the 
players are willing to form a grand coalition, or would some of them prefer to form 
smaller coalitions, i.e. defect from the grand coalition. Sometimes smaller coalitions can 
be more attractive to players, even if they lead to overall lower value than making a big 
coalition. Let’s consider an example. 
Voting core example 
We have a parliament that is made up of four political parties, A, B, C and D, which 
have 45, 25, 15 and 15 representatives (100 in total), respectively. They have to vote to 
pass a 100 mil spending law and how this money will be redistributed to each party for 
controlling. For the law to be passed there is a requirement of a majority vote, i.e. a min-
imum of 51 votes. Hence, if there is no majority, the law is not passed, and each party 
gets zero money to spend [32]. 
 
The Shapley value - calculate the Shapley value for each player. First we create society 
up by adding each player in a different order. The number of combinations is N! = 4! = 
24. We then calculate each player contribution; according to the order they were added. 
A AB ABC ABCD v(A)=0 v(B)=v(AB)–v(A)=1 v(C)=v(ABC)–v(BC)=0 v(D)=v(ABCD)–
v(ABC)=0 
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A AB ABD ABCD v(A)=0 v(B)=v(AB)–v(A)=1 v(C)=v(ABCD)–v(ABD)=0 v(D)= 
v(ABD)–v(AV)=0 
A AC ABC ABCD v(A)=0 v(B)=v(ABC)–v(AC)=0 v(C)=v(AC)–v(A)=1 v(D)=v(ABCD)–
v(ABC)=0 
A AC ACD ABCD v(A)=0 v(B)=v(ABCD)–v(ACD)=0 v(C)=v(AC)–v(A)=1 v(D)= 
v(ACD)–v(AC)=0 
A AD ABD ABCD v(A)=0 v(B)=v(ABD)–v(AD)=0 v(C)=v(ABCD)–v(ABD)=0 v(D)= 
v(AD)–v(A)=1 
A AD ACD ABCD v(A)=0 v(B)=v(ABCD)–v(ACD)=0 v(C)=v(ACD)–v(AD)=0 v(D)= 
v(AD)–v(A)=1 
B AB ABC ABCD v(A)=v(AB)–v(B)=1 v(B)=0 v(C)=v(ABC)–v(AB)=0 v(D)=v(ABCD)–
v(ABC)=0 
B AB ABD ABCD v(A)=v(AB)–v(B)=1 v(B)=0 v(C)=v(ABCD)–v(ABD)=0 v(D)= 
v(ABD)–v(AB)=0 
B BC ABC ABCD v(A)=v(ABC)–v(BC)=1 v(B)=0 v(C)=v(ABC)–v(AB)=0 v(D)= 
v(ABCD)–v(ABC)=0 
B BC BCD ABCD v(A)=v(ABC)–v(BC)=0 v(B)=0 v(C)=v(BC)–v(B)=0 v(D)=v(BCD)–
v(BC)=1 
B BD ABD ABCD v(A)=v(ABD)–v(BD)=1 v(B)=0 v(C)=v(ABCD)–v(ABD)=0 v(D)= 
v(BD)–v(B)=0 
B BD BCD ABCD v(A)=v(ABCD)–v(BCD)=0 v(B)=0 v(C)=v(BCD)–v(BD)=1 v(D)= 
v(BD)–v(B)=0 
C AC ABC ABCD v(A)=v(AC)–v(C)=1 v(B)=v(ABC)–v(AC)=0 v(C)=0 v(D)=v(ABCD)–
v(ABC)=0 
C AC ACD ABCD v(A)=v(AC)–v(C)=1 v(B)=v(ABCD)–v(ACD)=0 v(C)=0 v(D)= 
v(ACD)–v(AC)=0 
C BC ABC ABCD v(A)=v(ABC)–v(BC)=1 v(B)=v(BC)–v(C)=0 v(C)=0 v(D)=v(ABCD)–
v(ABC)=0 
C BC BCD ABCD v(A)=v(ABCD)–v(BCD)=0 v(B)=v(BC)–v(C)=0 v(C)=0 v(D)= 
v(BCD)–v(BC)=1 
C CD ACD ABCD v(A)=v(ACD)–v(CD)=1 v(B)=v(ABCD)–v(ACD)=0 v(C)=0 v(D)= 
v(CD)–v(C)=0 
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C CD BCD ABCD v(A)=v(ABCD)–v(BCD)=0 v(B)=v(BCD)–v(CD)=1 v(C)=0 v(D)= 
v(CD)–v(C)=0 
D AD ABD ABCD v(A)=v(AD)–v(D)=1 v(B)=v(ABD)–v(AD)=0 v(C)=v(ABCD)–
v(ABD)=0 v(D)=0 
D AD ACD ABCD v(A)=v(AD)–v(D)=1 v(B)=v(ABCD)–v(ACD)=0 v(C)=v(ACD)–
v(AD)=0 v(D)=0 
D BD ABD ABCD v(A)=v(ABD)–v(BD)=1 v(B)=v(BD)–v(D)=0 v(C)=v(ABCD)–
v(ABD)=0 v(D)=0 
D BD BCD ABCD v(A)=v(ABCD)–v(BCD)=0 v(B)=v(BD)–v(D)=0 v(C)=v(BCD)–
v(BD)=1 v(D)=0 
D CD ACD ABCD v(A)=v(ACD)–v(CD)=1 v(B)=v(ABCD)–v(ACD)=0 v(C)=v(CD)–
v(D)=0 v(D)=0 
D CD BCD ABCD v(A)=v(ABCD)–v(BCD)=0 v(B)=v(BCD)–v(CD)=1 v(C)=v(CD)–
v(D)=0 v(D)=0 
 
Looking at the first of the possible ways to create the grand coalition, we can see how 
much each player contributes to the coalition. Since in this particular game the only way 
to receive any payoff is to create a coalition with 51 members, each player will either 
contribute 1 or contribute nothing. When we add player A first, the marginal contribu-
tion is 0, since the number of members in party A is 45 which cannot make a coalition 
by themselves. If we then add party B with their 25 members, we make the majority 
(they have 70 members in total), so the contribution of B is 1. The contribution of C and 
D is 0, because the needed majority was made before they were added, so there is no 
need for their membership in the coalition. After we see the contribution of each player 
after the different ways of adding them, we can allocate the benefits they would get ac-
cording to the Shapley value. 
 
φA= (12*1 + 12*0)/4! = 12/24 = 0.5 
φB = (4*1 + 20*0)/4! = 4/24 = 0.167 
φC = (4*1 + 20*0)/4! = 4/24 = 0.167 
φD = (4*1 + 20*0)/4! = 4/24 = 0.167 
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When we add these values we sum up to 1. Since the benefits to be redistributed are 100 
mil, the Shapley value for all the players is: 
Shapley values (50, 16.67, 16.67 16.67) 
 
We can see that, even though player B has more votes than players C and D, they all get 
the same amount of benefits, i.e. sharing the half that is left when the first half is allo-
cated to player A. This arises the question: can a sub coalition gain by defecting the 
grand coalition? The answer from this question can be easily seen from the calculations 
we did to determine the Shapley value. While player A, as the majority player, cannot 
obtain the 51 votes needed for the bill to pass alone, if he makes a coalition with any 
other 1 member, can obtain the payoffs, thus gain more than 50 mil when the benefits 
are divided. Let’s look at a game like this one, when player A pairs with only one other 
player at a time. 
 
v(A)=45; v(B =25; v(AB)=100 
A AB v(A)=45 v(B)=v(AB)–v(A)=55 
B AB v(A)=v(AB)–v(B)=75 v(B)=25  
φA= (45+75)/2 = 60 
φB= (55+25)/2 = 40 
Shapley value (60, 40) – each player gets higher benefits than in the grand coalition. 
 
v(A)=45; v(C)=15; v(AC)=100 
A AC v(A)=45 v(C)=v(AC)–v(A)=55 
C AC v(A)=v(AC)–v(C)=85 v(C)=15 
φA= (45+85)/2 = 65 
φC = (55+15)/2 = 35 
Shapley value (65, 35) – each player gets higher benefits again, and A has the highest 
payout with this coalition. 
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What will happen if players B,C and D, decide to make a coalition and divide the pay-
offs among themselves, leaving the player with the most votes, A, out of the coalition? 
Let’s calculate the Shapley value. 
 
B BC BCD v(B)=0 v(C)=0 v(D)=1 
B BD BCD v(B)=0 v(D)=0 v(C)=1 
C BC BCD v(C)=0 v(B)=0 v(D)=1 
C CD BCD v(C)=0 v(D)=0 v(B)=1 
D BD BCD v(D)=0 v(B)=0 v(C)=1 
D CD BCD v(D)=0 v(C)=0 v(B)=1 
 
φB = (1 + 1)/3! = 2/6 = 0.33 
φC = (1 + 1)/3! = 2/6 = 0.33 
φD = (1 + 1)/3! = 2/6 = 0.33 
Shapley value (33, 33, 33) 
 
The highest value player A gets if they make a coalition with either C or D. but even if 
he makes a coalition with B, he would get more than when joining the grand coalition. 
For player B the best outcome is if he makes a coalition with player A. Even if he 
chooses to make a coalition with both C and D, he would get higher payoffs than when 
he was part of the grand coalition. Players C and D, being with the same number of vot-
ers, also benefit the most if the individually make a coalition with A. They also have the 
option to make a coalition together with B, and still make higher payoffs than in the 
grand coalition. 
We can see that all the players have a good incentive to defect the grand coalition and 
form smaller coalitions, of 2 or 3 players, depending if they form a coalition with A in it 
(2 players suffice) or if they leave A out of the game (three players needed for a majori-
ty vote).  
So under what condition will the players be willing to form the grand coalition? The an-
swer is that they will do so if and only if the payment division plan is drawn from a set 
called the core. 
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Definition of the core 
 
A payoff vector x is in the core of a coalitional game (N,v) iff [33] 
∑ ∈ ≥⊆∀ jSxi SvNS )(,  
The sum of payoffs to the players in any subcoalition S is at least as much as they could 
earn on their own. In the previous voting game we saw that the opposite was happening, 
and that the players were getting less in the grand coalition than what they could have 
gotten if they defected and formed a subcoalition.  But if there are no coalitions under 
which the players could have gotten more payments, then the payoff vector is in the 
core. 
This theory is similar to the Nash equilibrium, because the agents don’t have any 
profitable deviations, i.e. reasons to defect the coalition when the payoff vector is in the 
core. The difference with Nash equilibrium is that in the core theory, groups of agents 
can jointly defect the coalition, making it a stronger notion than the Nash equilibrium, in 
a sense that we don’t think only about unilateral deviations. 
 
Core existence and uniqueness 
When thinking about a solution we should always think about two things: is the solution 
always returning something; and is the result one thing, a sharp recommendation, or 
does is return multiple things? This is when we think of the core solution existence and 
uniqueness. 
Is the core always non-empty, i.e. does it always exist? The answer is no. We can 
consider the voting game to find the answer to this question. The coalitions that were 
more profitable for the players in order to get the majority vote count of 51 were the 
following: {A,B}, {A,C}, {A,D}, {B,C,D}. if the sum of the payoffs of B, C and D is 
less than the total of 100 mil, if each one of them decides to make a coalition with A, 
they have a reason to defect and for their own coalition, leaving player A out. On the 
other hand, if B, C and D decide to make a coalition and get the entire payoff of 100 
mil, leaving A with 0, thus incetivising A to make a coaltion with whichever from B, C 
or D obtained the lowest payoff. So for this game the core is empty. 
  -59- 
Is the core always unique? The answer to this question is again no. lets consider that the 
winning majority is now 80% insdead of 51. The minimal winning coalitions are now 
{A,B,C} and {A,B,D}. Now the case is that A and B are required in all winning 
coalitions, meaning that any complete distribution of the 100 mil among A and B now 
belongs to the core. This is because even if C and D are not being payed, they cannot 
make a winning coalition without A and B. The stability of the grand coalition is 
guaranteed as long as the payoffs are divided among A and B only. 
Simple game 
A game G=(N,v) is called simple if it is monotone, v(A)∈{0,1} for each A⊆N and 
v(N)=1. This means that if the value of the coalition is either 0 or 1, it is considered a 
simple game [34]. The voting game we explained before is a simple game, since we ei-
ther had 100 million to distribute, or 0, depending on whether we get a majority or not. 
A player i∈N is said to be a veto player if he belongs to each winning coalition i.e. 
v(N/{i})=0. So if a given coalition doesn’t involve the veto player, the value of that coa-
lition is 0. In our example, when the majority needed was 51%, the core was empty, 
since there were no veto players. In the case when the majority required was 80%, the 
veto players were A and B, thus the payments were to be distributed only among these 
members. 
 
- Theorem – in a simple game the core is empty iff there is no veto player. If there 
are veto players, the core consists of all payoff vectors in which the non-veto 
players get 0. 
 
Convex games 
A game is considered to be convex if for all coalitions (S,T) that are strict subsets of the 
set N, the value of the union of the coalitions is at least as big as the value that the first 
can achieve by itself, plus the value of what the second can achieve by itself, minus the 
amount that the coalition in common between these two, can achieve for itself [32]. 
For all S,T⊂N, v(S∪T)≥v(S)+v(T)-v(S∩T). 
The convexity is a stronger notion than superadditivity, since the latter assumed that the 
intersection between the coalitions is empty, while here we are allowing them to have an 
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intersection and considering the value of this intersection in the equation. So here we 
take in consideration a set where a player can belong to more than one coalition.  
 
- Theorems – Every convex game has a nonempty core. There is always at least 
one way to divide the payments among the players in order to support the grand 
coalition in a way that no subset of the agents will be willing to deviate from the 
grand coalition to make their own coalition and produce higher benefits. Also, in 
every convex game, the Shapley value is in the core of the game. So in these 
games, dividing the game’s payoffs in a way that is stable (according to the core 
definition) and dividing the payoffs in a way that is fair (according to the Shap-
ley value), gives us the same result. 
The game we are considering next is a convex one. 
 
The airport game example 
Lets consider the following game: several neigbouring cities need an airport capacity, 
with different cities needing to accommodate aircraft of different sizes [35]. They need 
to decide whether each of the cities is going to build their own airport, or they will come 
together and build a regional airport and split the costs among themselves. If a new 
regional airport is built, the cost will depend on the largest aircraft that the runway can 
accommodate. Otherwise, each city will have to build their own airport. This situation 
can be modeled as a coalitional game (N,v), where N is the set of cities, and v(S) is the 
sum of the costs of building runways for each city in S minus the cost of the largest 
runway required by any city in S. The cities are A, B, C and D that have a need of 
building ariports with different sizes of runway. Their individual costs are 8, 11, 13, 18 
for each city respectively. Table 2 we can see the distribution of cost to each player. 
 
Table 2 Four cities with their marginal contribution to the overall cost 
Aircraft Adding A Adding B Adding C Adding D 
Shapley 
value 
Marginal 
cost 
8 3 2 5  
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Cost to A 2    2 
Cost to B 2 1   3 
Cost to C 2 1 1  4 
Cost to D 2 1 1 5 9 
Total     18 
 
Shapley value (2,3,4,9) - the cost allocation if the cities decide to build the airport 
together and split the cost. The cost that will be incured in this case, is lower than if they 
decide to build 4 airports, one for each city. The grand coalition is the best solution for 
each of the players, so they don’t have an incentive to deviate from it and form a subset 
coalition. 
 
3.1.2 Fairness (Shapley theorem) 
What is a fair way to divide the benefits? It depends on the way we define fairness. Ac-
cording to Lloyd Shapley, the division of the benefits should be according to their mar-
ginal contribution, or each member should receive a payoff proportional to how much 
they add value to the coalition. Sometimes this simple division becomes complicated 
[36]. Let’s say that we have a committee where everyone has to be present in order to 
pass a suggestion. In this case, v(N)=1, v(S)=0 and N≠S where N is the total number of 
players, S is a coalition when a member is missing. Then, v(N)–v(N\{i})=1 for every i 
making each member’s marginal contribution 1, thus everyone is essential to generating 
any value. In this situation, we cannot allocate everyone their marginal contribution. 
There is a need to come up with some weighting system to allocate the benefits among 
the players. We can just divide the benefits evenly over to each player, so everyone get 
1/N of the value. But what happens when the players contribute asymmetrical value to 
the coalition? The Shapley’s axioms give some weighting system proposition which 
help allocate the value properly. 
 
Shapley axioms 
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- Symmetry – Let’s take two members of the total number of players, i and j. If 
they always contribute the same amount of value to any given coalition they can 
be a part of, they are considered to be completely interchangeable. This means 
that for every coalition S that has neither i nor j in it, if we add i to that coalition 
we get exactly the same value as if we would add j to the same coalition. The 
symmetry is expressed as v(S∪{i})=v(S∪{j})[37]. 
Axiom 
For any v, if i and j are interchangeable then φi(N,v)=φj (N,v), meaning they 
should get the same allocation of value φ. 
 
- Dummy players - a player i is a dummy player, if when added to coalition S, he 
adds no value. So for all S:v(S∪{i})=v(S) where v is the value of the coalition S 
when player i is added. 
Axiom 
For any v, if i is a dummy player, then φi(N,v)=0, meaning if the player contrib-
utes no value, they should get no benefit from the coalition. 
 
- Additivity - if we can separate a game in two parts, or have two games and we 
want to sum up their separate value in a combined way, meaning v=v1+v2, then 
we should be able to decompose the payments as well. 
Axiom 
For any two games, v1 and v2, φi(N,v1+v2)=φi(N,v1)+φi(N, v2) for each i, where 
the game (N,v1+v2) is defined by (v1+v2)(S)=v1(S)+v2(S) for every coalition S, 
meaning the allocation of benefits from the two games together should be the 
same as when we sum up the separate benefits of both individual games. 
 
Shapley theorem 
 
Given a coalitional game (N,v), the Shapley value divides payoffs among players [38] 
according to (Figure 32  Shapley theoremFigure 32): 
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Figure 32  Shapley theorem 
 
It is basicly a marginal contribution calculation, thus we calculate the marginal 
contribution of i when we add it to a coalition S that does not have i in it, then weigh 
this result with the different possible ways we could have come up with the marginal 
calculation and then dividing it through all the possible ways that it could have been 
done. This is done for each player i of the set. 
Theorem 
Given a coalitional game (N,v), there is a unique payoff division x(v)=φ(N,v) that 
divides the full payoff of the grand coalition and that satisfies the Symmetry, Dummy 
player and Additivity axioms; the Shapley Value. 
This captures the “marginal contributions” of agent i, averaging over all the different 
sequences according to which the grand coalition can be built up. 
 
Building up society (grand coalition) 
There are many different ways we can build a society up. For example, lets take a 3 
person game and start adding the players to build the whole set [34]. 
1    12   123   person 1 contributes something, then person 2, then person 3 
1    13   123 
2    12   123 
2    23   123 
3    13   123 
3    23   123 
So we have all these possible ways of creating the grand coalition of the 3 players, 
depending who we add first to start building the society. Depending on the order of 
adding each player, we have different marginal contributions from each player. So, for 
any such sequence, we should look at agent i’s marginal contribution when added:  
[v(S∪{i})-v(S)]. Next, we weight this quantitiy by the different (|S|!) ways the set S 
could have been formed prior i’s addition and by the different ways the other players 
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can be added after i has been added((|N| - |S| - 1)!). Then we sum this result over al 
possible sets S that are there before i is added, and average by dividing by the number of 
possible orderings of all agents |N|!. 
The way to see how each player is adding value to the coalition we can see the previous 
example. We have N=3 players and each are being added in a different order. We have 
N!=6 ways to make the grand coalition. We than calculate the value of player whan 
when he is added to the coalition. 
 
1  12  123   v(1) 
1  13  123   v(1) 
2  21  123   v(12)–v(2) 
2  23  123   v(123)–v(23) 
3  31  123   v(13)–v(3) 
3  32  123   v(123)–v(23) 
 
Each of these values is weighted by 1/6. Since the result from the first two is the same, 
the value is weighted by 1/3, as is the 4th and 6th order. The other 2 are weighted by 1/6. 
This gives us the total value of the Shapley value and tells us what player 1 should be 
getting from the game. 
 
Two player game 
 
We have 2 partners sharing their profits. Person 1 produces value 1 while person 2 pro-
duces value 2. Together they make a value of 4, thus they get a higher value when they 
work together rather than working separately [34]. 
v({1})=1; v({2})=2; v({1,2})=4 
 
The possible ways to build the society up i.e. create the grand coalition from the players 
are only two (N!=2): whether we add person 1 or person 2 first to make the coalition. 
Then we can calculate the payoff that person 1 should be getting from the coalition, de-
pending on when he was added and thus his marginal contribution towards the coalition. 
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1   12   v(1)=1 
2   12   v(12)–v(2)=4–2=2 
They are weighted by 1/2, since there are 2 ways to build society up. With this we can 
calculate the payoff that person 1 should be getting. 
φ1=1*1/2+2*1/2=0.5+1=1.5 
This means that φ2 is going to be 2.5 (φ2=4-φ1=2.5). 
Shapley value (1.5, 2.5) 
 
From the example we can see that the payoffs are not just divided half each, but are dis-
tributed more fairly, by giving person 2 a bigger piece of the total benefits, which is the 
basic notion of the Shapley value. 
3.2 The examined scenario 
In this section we elaborate our scenario of prosumers, how they will group and cooper-
ate in order to share electricity with other users, and then resell electricity to the grid, 
and how these benefits will be shared fairly among them. 
3.2.1 System model 
The system to be modeled is the following: we have a community of a set I of |I|=10 
prosumers and consumers i, since some of the households are consuming and producing 
electricity (from rooftop solar systems) and some households only consume electricity. 
Each i, furthermore belongs to a subset M,N,K⊂C, where C is the set of consumption of 
users. There are different sizes of households with different electricity consumption and 
are divided in these three groups, depending on their average daily electricity needs: 
5kWh, 10kWh and 20kWh consumption per household, where M={1,2,3,4}, 
N={5,6,7,8} and K={9,10}. We assume that each user belonging to a group has the same 
consumption as members in the same group, and different from users of different 
groups. Since the consumption of each player belonging to a group is different from a 
member of another group |Mx|≠|Ny|≠|Kz|, Czyx ∈∀ ,, . In Figure 33 we can see the 
grouping by consumption levels. 
 
-66- 
 
Picture 32.  
 
Group M – made of 4 users that consume 5kWh per day or 152kWh per month each. 
Two of them are consumers only, while 2 of them both consume and produce electricity. 
Group N – made of 4 users who consume 10kWh per day or average 304kWh per month 
each. Together they account for 1216kWh electricity spent in the community. In this 
group, only user 7 does not produce electricity. 
Group K – even though this is the smallest group made of 2 users, where both spend 
20kWh of electricity daily or 608kWh per month, each, they account for the biggest 
consumption in the community, consuming as a group 1216kWh of electricity monthly. 
Both of them are considered prosumers since they also produce energy. 
 
The amount of energy produced depends on the PV system capacity and the number of 
peak sun hours (PSH) per day. Since the number of effective sun hours is different in 
different locations, we decided to model this community to be near Thessaloniki. The 
number of peak sun hours in Thessaloniki throughout the year is different depending on 
the month of year are presented in Table 3. 
 
Figure 33 Prosumers and their consumption patterns 
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Table 3  PSH in Thessaloniki 
month January February March April May June July August September October November December 
PSH 3.8 4.6 5.4 6.2 8.3 10.2 10.8 9.4 7.5 5.3 3.7 2.7 
 
The users have installed different solar system capacities, each capable of producing dif-
ferent amounts of power. The users that do not produce any capacity are going to use 
the excess electricity from the other members in the community. The capacity of the 
panels installed is from 1kW to 4kW. All except one of the prosumers can produce more 
electricity than they spend on an average monthly. The excess energy they will share it 
with the non-producing users and users that spend more electricity than they produce.  
 
Installed PV capacities – users have different electricity production capacities based on 
their needs and possibilities to produce electricity at all. We denote with SCn the system 
capacity of prosumer KNMn ,,∈  where M,N,K⊂P, and P denotes the production of 
each user. There are 5 different types of system capacities SC, where SCa={2,4,7}, 
SCb={3}, SCc={1,5,6,8}, SCd={10} and SCe={9}. The production of each group differs 
from production of users belonging to another group, hence 
|SCa|≠|SCb|≠|SCc|≠|SCd|≠|SCe|, Pedcba ∈∀ ,,,, . 
 
SCa (no installed PV capacity) – these are the users that are not prosumers, thus have no 
installed solar system. The consumers belonging to this group are users 2, 4 and 7. 
SCb (1kW system) – this system is installed by user 3 and produces on average 
197.8kWh per month. Depending on the month of year, the lowest electricity produced 
is 83.7kWh and the highest 334.8kWh.  
SCc (2kW system) – the system installed by user 1, 5, 6 and 8 produces on average 
395.6kWh per month. It produces 4747kWh yearly per user. The lowest production is 
167.4kWh, while the highest is 669.6kWh. 
SCd (3kW system) – this system is installed by user 10 only, peaking at a production of 
1004.4kWh in July, while the lowest production is 251.1kWh in a month. The average 
monthly production is 593.4kWh. 
SCe (4kW system) – the last installed system in the community is used by user 9. The 
yearly production is 9494kWh, while the monthly average is 791.7  
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In Figure 1Figure 34 we can see the monthly average production of each PV system ca-
pacity throughout the whole year. We can see that during the summer there is the high-
est production. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 35 we can see the society we are going to model in this paper. It is presented 
as a community of houses, where some produce electricity, some don’t. The amount of 
produced and consumed electricity is presented together with their surplus of deficit of 
electricity. Their total electricity production and consumption is presented as well. 
Figure 34  Monthly average production depending on PSH and system PV capacity 
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Figure 35 Community of consumers and prosumers 
 
Table 4 denotes all the users, with their production capacity, monthly average consump-
tion and production, as well as the difference between those two in order to have the 
amount of kWh 
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Table 4  Users from the community with their consumption, production and difference 
 
With this scenario, all of the prosumers, except for user 10, will cover their own elec-
tricity needs and have excess energy to fulfill the need of the consumers in the commu-
nity. 
 
3.2.2 Problem statement 
The problem we are addressing now is how the users are going to group themselves to 
achieve the highest benefits. We will model the benefits of the producers with surplus 
electricity, since they are the ones that should collaborate among each other to satisfy 
the needs of the consumers in the society.  
From the considered consumption and production patterns, we can see that 6 of the us-
ers i have a surplus S={1,3,5,6,8,9}, and 4 of them have a deficit of electricity 
D={2,4,7,10}. The total deficit is D=622.6 kWh. The total surplus is S=747.7 kWh. We 
model the prosumers and how their surplus will be distributed to cover the deficit of the 
consumers. Three of the users C={5,6,8}, SC ⊂ , have the same amount of surplus 
Prosumers/Consumers 
Type of PV 
system in-
stalled 
Monthly average 
consumption 
(kWh) 
Monthly average 
production 
(kWh) 
Difference between 
production and con-
sumption 
U1 2kW 152 395.6 +243.6 
U2 N/A 152 0 -152 
U3 1kW 152 197.8 +45.8 
U4 N/A 152 0 -152 
U5 2kW 304 395.6 +91.6 
U6 2kW 304 395.6 +91.6 
U7 N/A 304 0 -304 
U8 2kW 304 395.6 +91.6 
U9 4kW 608 791.7 +183.7 
U10 3kW 608 593.4 -14.6 
Sum  3040 3165 +125 
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(91.6 kWh), so they decide to team and act as a single player C in order to gain more 
benefits, since in calculating the Shapley value, the higher the contribution, the higher 
the benefits. After the Shapley value is calculated, they distribute the benefits three-way. 
For this game, we consider the electricity price is the same in the society, which is set at 
0.1 euro per kWh. So, the total benefits to be shared by the producing homes will be 
62.26 eur. We consider the following players SDCBA ⊂,,, where User 1 => A; User 3 
=> B; User 5,6 and 8 => C; User 9 => D 
3.2.3 Proposed algorithm 
For the purpose of this model, we assume the following pseudo code as a part of the al-
gorithm we developed to distribute earnings among the players N=4, as seen in Table 5. 
Table 5 Model pseudo code 
1 Define prosumers and consumers 
in the set 
I = 10, i∈I, 
2 Group users in different sets of 
consumption habits 
M,N,K⊂Cn 
M={1,2,3,4}, N={5,6,7,8} K={9,10} 
|Mx|≠|Ny|≠|Kz|, nCzyx ∈∀ ,,  
3 Group prosumers in different 
system capabilities 
SCn is system capacity of prosumer KNMn ,,∈  where 
M,N,K⊂P, and the production P of each user. There are 5 dif-
ferent types of system capacities SC, where SCa={2,4,7}, 
SCb={3}, SCc={1,5,6,8}, SCd={10} and SCe={9}.  
|SCa|≠|SCb|≠|SCc|≠|SCd|≠|SCe|, Pedcba ∈∀ ,,,,  
4 Calculate electricity produced 
according to PV system capability 
and PSH, electricity consumed 
and difference 
Tp=Σ(SCn*PSH)=3165, Tc=Σ(Μ+Ν+Κ)=3040, 
Tp-Tc=125kWh 
5 Define which prosumers have 
surplus electricity 
S={1,3,5,6,8,9} 
D={2,4,7,10} 
U1=>A, U3=>B, U5,U6,U8=>C, U9=>D 
A,B,C,D⊂S 
6 Define amount of electricity in 
surplus and deficit 
S=747.7 kWh 
D=622.6 kWh 
7 Define value to be distributed P=0.1 eur v(ABCD)=6226.2 
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among prosumers with surplus 
electricity 
 Mathematically model prosumers with surplus electricity 
8 Use Shapley mathematical model 
to distribute gains among 
prosumers with surplus 
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9 Find value of each possible coali-
tion 
G={N,v}, N={A,B,C,D}, v(ABCD)=62.26;2N = 24=16 
10 Find possible ways to build the 
grand coalition 
N=4; N!=4!=24 
11 Calculate Shapley value for each 
player in the grand coalition 
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12 If the grand coalition is stable ∑ ∈ ≥⊆∀ jSxi SvNS )(,  
13 End  
14 Else v’(S’)> v(S), S’⊂S 
15 Users choose to defect 
grand coalition 
d ∈S’, v’d>vd 
16 Find which coalition can be 
formed and which player can de-
fect 
S{A,C,D} 
17 Find veto and dummy players Veto player: i∈N, v(N\{i})=0 
Dummy player: v(S∪{i})=v(S), ∀ v, φi(N,v)=0 
18 Find value of each possible coali-
tion 
G={N,v}, N={A,,C,D}, v(ACD)=62.26;2N = 23=8 
19 Find possible ways to build the 
grand coalition 
N=3; N!=3!=6 
20 Calculate Shapley value of each 
player in new coalition 
[ ]∑
⊆
−∪−−=
}\{
)(}){()!1|||(||!|1),(
iNS
i SviSvSNSN
vNϕ  
21 Compare Shapley value when 
players belong to stable set or 
grand coalition 
 
 Consider each player changing their consumption pattern 
22 When consumption of 
player A changes, while 
consumption of other 
players stays the same 
B,C,D∈Cn, A’∈Cn’, Cn’⊂ Cn 
  -73- 
23 Calculate Shapley value 
of all players for 4 cases 
of player A consumption 
change 
[ ]∑
⊆
−∪−−=
}\{
)(}){()!1|||(||!|1),(
iNS
i SviSvSNSN
vNϕ  
24 Make graph of shapley 
value change of all play-
ers 
 
25 When consumption of 
player C changes, while 
consumption of other 
players stays the same 
A,B,D∈Cn, C’∈Cn’, Cn’⊂ Cn 
26 Calculate shapley value 
of all players for 4 cases 
of player C consumption 
change 
[ ]∑
⊆
−∪−−=
}\{
)(}){()!1|||(||!|1),(
iNS
i SviSvSNSN
vNϕ  
27 Make graph of shapley 
value change of all play-
ers 
 
28 When consumption of 
player D changes, while 
consumption of other 
players stays the same 
A,B,C∈Cn, D’∈Cn’, Cn’⊂ Cn 
29 Calculate shapley value 
of all players for 4 cases 
of player D consumption 
change 
[ ]∑
⊆
−∪−−=
}\{
)(}){()!1|||(||!|1),(
iNS
i SviSvSNSN
vNϕ  
30 Make graph of shapley 
value change of all play-
ers 
 
31 Calculate difference between total 
surplus and total deficit of all 
users in the society 
Tp-Tc=125.3kWh 
32 Calculate leftover electricity of 
each player according to Shapley 
value calculated in the grand coa-
lition without changes of electrici-
ty consumption by any player 
v’(N)=v(N)-φN, A,B,C,D∈N 
 Create different scenarios to sell electricity to the power grid, according to price per kWh 
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33 Case 1 – flat selling 
price 
φN=v(Ν)p, p=0.1 
34 Calculate 
Shapley value 
[ ]∑
⊆
−∪−−=
}\{
)(}){()!1|||(||!|1),(
iNS
i SviSvSNSN
vNϕ  
35 Case 2 – linear increase 
in selling price 
φN=Σ[v(Ν)pι], 0,1>ι>0,2 
36 Set price for 
different rounds 
of selling spe-
cific amount of 
electricity 
 
37 Calculate Shap-
ley value of 
players for each 
amount of elec-
tricity 
 
38 Sum all values 
per player to 
calculate final 
Shapley value 
 
39 Case 3 – exponential in-
crease in selling price 
φN=Σ[v(Ν)pι], 0,05>ι>0,2 
40 Set price for 
different rounds 
of selling spe-
cific amount of 
electricity 
 
41 Calculate 
Shapley value 
 
42 Sum all values 
per player to 
calculate final 
Shapley value 
 
43 Case 4 – linear decrease 
in selling price 
φN=Σ[v(Ν)pι], 0,1>ι>0,2 
44 Set price for 
different rounds 
of selling spe-
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cific amount of 
electricity 
45 Calculate 
Shapley value 
 
46 Sum all values 
per player to 
calculate final 
Shapley value 
 
47 Compare Shapley values 
from all 4 cases and 
draw conclusions. 
 
 
4 Results 
In this chapter we propose a solution to the electricity sharing problem using the Shap-
ley theorem. In the first part we model all players as a part of the grand coalition. Next 
we examine the stable set and compare the results to the grand coalition values. Then we 
compute the value using the Shapley theorem for all users when one user changes con-
sumption, while the remaining users’ consumption stays constant. We compare results 
and how the value of each users changes with the electricity surplus change. Next we 
calculate the electricity that is not consumed by the users in the community, electricity 
to be sold to the grid via four different pricing schemes. We calculate a fair distribution 
of payments among players and compare to see which pricing scheme incurs the most 
benefits to users. 
4.1.1 Calculations using the Shapley theorem 
We have a 4 player game G={N,v}, where N={A,B,C,D} and v(ABCD)=62.26 which 
means that the number of coalitions possible is 24=16 (Table 6). The possible ways to 
build the grand coalition is 4! = 24 (Table 7). 
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Table 6 Possible coalitions of players in a game 
Coalitions 
Value of the characteristic function 
v Benefits (euro) Benefits (kWh) 
1 S = {Ø} v( Ø) 0 0 
2 S = {A} v(A) 24.36 243.6 
3 S = {B} v(B) 4.58 45.8 
4 S = {C} v(C) 27.48 274.8 
5 S = {D} v(D) 18.37 183.7 
6 S = {A,B} v(AB) 28.94 289.4 
7 S = {A,C} v(AC) 51.84 518.4 
8 S = {A,D} v(AD) 42.73 427.3 
9 S = {B,C} v(BC) 32.06 320.6 
10 S = {B,D} v(BD) 22.95 229.5 
11 S = {C,D} v(CD) 45.85 458.5 
12 S = {A,B,C} v(ABC) 56.42 564.2 
13 S = {A,B,D} v(ABD) 47.31 473.1 
14 S = {A,C,D} v(ACD) 70.21 702.1 
15 S = {B,C,D} v(BCD) 50.43 504.3 
16 S = {A,B,C,D} v(ABCD) 62.26 622.6 
 
Table 7 Possible ways to build up society 
Ways to build up society 
(grand coalition) 
A is added first B is added first C is added first D is added first 
N!=4!=24 
ways to build the grand coali-
tion 
A; AB; ABC; 
ABCD 
A; AB; ABD; 
ABCD 
A; AC; ACB; 
ABCD 
A; AC; ACD; 
B; BA; BAC; 
ABCD 
B; BA; BAD; 
ABCD 
B; BC; BCA; 
ABCD 
B; BC; BCD; 
C; CA; CAB; 
ABCD 
C; CA; CAD; 
ABCD 
C; CB; CBA; 
ABCD 
C; CB; CBD; 
D; DA; DAB; 
ABCD 
D; DA; DAC; 
ABCD 
D; DB; DBA; 
ABCD 
D; DB; DBC; 
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ABCD 
A; AD; ADB; 
ABCD 
A; AD; ADC; 
ABCD 
ABCD 
B; BD BDA; 
ABCD 
B; BD; BDC 
ABCD 
ABCD 
C; CD; CDA; 
ABCD 
C; CD; CDB; 
ABCD 
ABCD 
D; DC; DCA; 
ABCD 
D; DC; DCB; 
ABCD 
 
After we have calculated all the possible coalition values and the possible ways to create 
the grand coalition, we can calculate the Shapley value for each player. 
 
φA= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(BCD))/24] = (6*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 
2*16.41 + 6*11.83)/24 = (389.76 + 32.82 + 70.98)/24 = 493.56/24 = 20.565 
φB= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ACD))/24] = (6*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 
6*0)/24 = 82.44/24 = 3.435 
φC= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABD))/24] = (6*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*19.53 + 
2*27.48 + 6*14.95)/24 = (439.68 + 39.06 + 89.7)/24 = 568.44/24 = 23.685 
φD= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(D) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABC))/24] = (6*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*10.42 + 
2*18.37 + 6*5.84)/24 = (293.92 + 20.84 + 35.04)/24 = 349.8/24 = 14.575 
Shapley value (20.565, 3.435, 23.685, 14.575) 
 
Check if the coalition is stable 
The distribution of benefits we have with the Shapley value is fair, but not stable. The 
sum of electricity available is more than the electricity needed in the society. As player 
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B has a small amount to contribute to the coalition, and as we can see that the value of 
coalition S{A,C,D} is more than the electricity needed, these 3 players can decide to 
form a coalition of their own and share the profit among themselves.  
 
In this case the Shapley value would be (21.71, 24.83, 15.72).  
Here are the calculations: First we have to find the possible ways to build up society, 
that in this case with N=3 is 3! = 6 (Table 8), and the possible coalitions, which are 2N = 
23 = 8 (Table 9). 
 
Table 8 Possible coalitions of players in the stable game 
Coalition 
Value of the characteristic function 
v Benefits (euro) Benefits (kWh) 
1 S = {Ø} v( Ø) 0 0 
2 S = {A} v(A) 24.36 243.6 
3 S = {C} v(C) 27.48 274.8 
4 S = {D} v(D) 18.37 183.7 
5 S = {A,C} v(AC) 51.84 518.4 
6 S = {A,D} v(AD) 42.73 427.3 
7 S = {C,D} v(CD) 45.85 458.5 
8 S = {A,C,D} v(ACD) 62.26 622.6 
 
Table 9 Possible ways to build up society of stable coalition 
Ways to build up society 
(grand coalition) 
A is added first C is added first D is added first 
N!=3!=6 ways to build  
stable coalition 
A; AC; ACD 
A; AD; ADC 
C; CA; CAD  
C; CD; CDA 
D; DA; DAC 
D; DC; DCA 
 
After we have the values of each possible coalition and the possible ways to make the 
stable coalition, we can calculate the Shapley value for each player. 
φA= 1/3! Σ [(2*v(A) + v(ACD)-v(C) + v(ACD)-v(D) + 2*v(ACD)-v(CD))/6] = (2*24.36 
+ 2*24.36 + 2*16.41)/6 = (97.44 + 32.82)/6 = 130.26/6 = 21.71 
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φC= 1/3! Σ [(2*v(C) + v(ACD)-v(A) + v(ACD)-v(D) + 2*v(ACD)-v(AD))/6] = (2*27.48 
+ 2*27.48 + 2*19.53/6 = (109.92 + 39.06)/6 = 148.98/6 = 24.83 
φD= 1/3! Σ [(2*v(D) + v(ACD)-v(A) + v(ACD)-v(C) + 2*v(ACD)-v(AC))/6] = (2*18.37 
+ 2*18.37 + 2*10.42)/6 = (73.48 + 20.84)/6 = 94.32/6 = 15.72 
The benefits of players A, C and D are higher in this coalition without B than in the 
grand coalition. This means that the grand coalition does not belong in the core and it is 
considered unstable. This is also why it is better for users 5, 6 and 8 to act as one player 
(player C), so they have to be in the set in order for the game to be viable. We can also 
conclude that these players are considered veto players, since any profitable coalition 
has to contain them in the set. Player B is considered a dummy player when added last to 
the grand coalition since they contribute no value to it. 
 
4.1.2 Calculation using the Shapley theorem when players change 
consumption behavior 
We consider the change of players’ Shapley value when one of the players changes their 
consumption amount, thus changing their surplus of electricity and contribution to the 
coalition. In each case, the consumption of other players remains constant. 
 
Player A changes consumption 
Let’s consider what happens to the Shapley value of all players, when one player chang-
es their consumption, while others’ consumption and surplus stays the same. In Table 10 
we can see how player’s A surplus changes when they change their consumption levels. 
Table 10 Change in A’s consumption leads to different possible benefits 
Monthly average  
consumption of player 
A 
Monthly average  
production of player 
A 
Surplus of player A’s electricity and possible bene-
fits 
v(A) kWh v(A) Euro 
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182.5 395.6 213.1 21.31 
212.9 395.6 182.7 18.27 
243.3 395.6 152.3 15.23 
273.7 395.6 121.9 12.19 
 
Now we calculate the Shapley value for each player, which we expect to be different 
depending on the 4 values of player A. 
a) v(A) = 21.31 Shapley value (18.532, 3.435, 24.701, 15.592) 
φA= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(BCD))/24] = (6*21.31 + 2*21.31 + 2*21.31 + 2*21.31 + 2*21.31 + 2*21.31 + 
2*16.41 + 6*11.83)/24 = (340.96 + 32.82 + 70.98)/24 = 444.76/24 = 18.532 
φB= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ACD))/24] = (6*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 
6*0)/24 = 82.44/24 = 3.435 
φC= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABD))/24] = (6*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*22.58 + 
2*27.48 + 6*18)/24 = (439.68 + 45.16 + 108)/24 = 592.84/24 = 24.701 
φD= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(D) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABC))/24] = (6*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*13.47 + 
2*18.37 + 6*8.89)/24 = (293.92 + 26.94 + 53.34)/24 = 374.2/24 = 15.592 
 
b) v(A) = 18.27 Shapley value (16.505, 3.435, 25.715, 16.605) 
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φA= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(BCD))/24] = (6*18.27 + 2*18.27 + 2*18.28 + 2*18.27 + 2*18.27 + 2*18.27 + 
2*16.41 + 6*11.83)/24 = (292.32 + 32.82 + 70.98)/24 = 396.12/24 = 16.505 
φB= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ACD))/24] = (6*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 
6*0)/24 = 82.44/24 = 3.435 
φC= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABD))/24] = (6*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*25.62 + 
2*27.48 + 6*21.04)/24 = (439.68 + 51.24 + 126.24)/24 = 617.16/24 = 25.715 
φD= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(D) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABC))/24] = (6*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*16.51 + 
2*18.37 + 6*11.93)/24 = (293.92 + 33.02 + 71.58)/24 = 398.52/24 = 16.605 
c) v(A) = 15.23 Shapley value (14.38, 3.73, 26.63, 17.52) 
φA= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(BCD))/24] = (6*15.23 + 2*15.23 + 2*15.23 + 2*15.23 + 2*15.23 + 2*15.23 + 
2*15.23 + 6*11.83)/24 = (274.14 + 70.98)/24 = 345.12/24 = 14.38 
φB= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ACD))/24] = (6*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 
6*1.18)/24 = (82.44 + 7.08)/24 = 89.52/24 = 3.73 
φC= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABD))/24] = (6*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 
2*27.48 + 6*24.08)/24 = (494.64 + 144.48)/24 = 639.12/24 = 26.63 
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φD= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(D) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABC))/24] = (6*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 
2*18.37 + 6*14.97)/24 = (330.66 + 89.82)/24 = 420.48/24 = 17.52 
 
d) v(A) = 12.19 Shapley value (12.1, 4.49, 27.39, 18.28) 
φA= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(BCD))/24] = (6*12.19 + 2*12.19 + 2*12.19 + 2*12.19 + 2*12.19 + 2*12.19 + 
2*12.19 + 6*11.83)/24 = (219.42 + 70.98)/24 = 290.4/24 = 12.1 
φB= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ACD))/24] = (6*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 
6*4.22)/24 = (82.44 + 25.32)/24 = 107.76/24 = 4.49 
φC= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABD))/24] = (6*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 2*27.48 + 
2*27.48 + 6*27.12)/24 = (494.64 + 162.72)/24 = 657.36/24 = 27.39 
φD= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(D) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABC))/24] = (6*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 
2*18.37 + 6*18.01)/24 = (330.66 + 108.06)/24 = 438.72/24 = 18.28 
 
After calculating the Shapley values of all players in all four scenarios, we can plot them 
on a graph to see their behavior according to player’s A consumption change. In Figure 
36 we can see opposite movements of the value, as A’s value decreases, the other play-
ers’ values increase, with B’s value increasing slightly. This happens because B does 
not contribute much to the coalition, and in most of the cases can be left out of the win-
ning coalition. 
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Figure 36 Shapley value of all players in the game and how it changes when player’s A elec-
tricity surplus changes 
 
The Shapley value increases for players B, C and D, as the contribution of A decreases. 
After the point of A contributing 152.3 kWh to the society, the set becomes stable, and 
no one is considered to be a veto player, as well as no one can do better if they deflect 
the grand coalition. When A’s contribution, as well as benefits are higher than this, he, 
together with players C and D can deflect the grand coalition and obtain higher benefits 
than in the grand coalition. 
 
Player C changes consumption 
What happens when player’s C (a player that is a group of 3 users from the society) 
electricity needs increase, thus the value contributed decreases? We can see the possible 
changes in Table 11. 
Table 11 Change in C’s consumption leads to different possible benefits 
Monthly average consumption 
of player C 
Monthly average production 
of player C 
Surplus of player C’s electricity and 
possible benefits 
v(C) kWh v(C) Euro 
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939.87 395.6*3 = 1186.8 246.9 24.69 
958.12 1186.8 228.6 22.86 
976.37 1186.8 210.4 21.04 
1003.75 1186.8 183 18.3 
 
Since the production of C is made of 3 players, we sum the consumption of all 3 players 
and then subtract their total consumption in order to calculate their surplus. This surplus 
is then multiplied by 0.1 eur, which is the price per kWh. Now we can calculate the new 
Shapley values when these changes are taken into account. 
 
a) v(C) = 24.69 Shapley value (21.495, 3.435, 21.825, 15.505) 
 
φA= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(BCD))/24] = (6*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 
2*19.19 + 6*14.62)/24 = (389.76 + 38.38 + 87.72)/24 = 515.86/24 = 21.495 
φB= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ACD))/24] = (6*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 
6*0)/24 = 82.44/24 = 3.435 
φC= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABD))/24] = (6*24.69 + 2*24.69 + 2*24.69 + 2*24.69 + 2*24.69+ 2*19.53 + 2*24.69 
+ 6*14.95)/24 = (395.04 + 39.06 + 89.7)/24 = 523.8/24 = 21.825 
φD= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(D) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABC))/24] = (6*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*13.21 + 
2*18.37 + 6*8.63)/24 = (293.92 + 26.42 + 51.78)/24 = 372.12/24 = 15.505 
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b) v(C) = 22.86 Shapley value (22.105, 3.435, 20.605, 16.115) 
φA= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(BCD))/24] = (6*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 
2*21.03 + 6*16.45)/24 = (389.76 + 42.06 + 98.7)/24 = 530.52/24 = 22.105 
φB= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ACD))/24] = (6*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 
6*0)/24 = 82.44/24 = 3.435 
φC= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABD))/24] = (6*22.86 + 2*22.86 + 2*22.86 + 2*22.86 + 2*22.86 + 2*19.53 + 
2*22.86 + 6*14.95)/24 = (365.76 + 39.06 + 89.7)/24 = 494.52/24 = 20.605 
φD= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(D) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABC))/24] = (6*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*15.04 + 
2*18.37 + 6*10.46)/24 = (293.92 + 30.08 + 62.76)/24 = 386.76/24 = 16.115 
c) v(C) = 21.04 Shapley value (22.712, 3.435, 19.392, 16.721) 
φA= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(BCD))/24] = (6*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 
2*22.85 + 6*18.27)/24 = (389.76 + 45.7 + 109.62)/24 = 545.08/24 = 22.712 
φB= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ACD))/24] = (6*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 
6*0)/24 = 82.44/24 = 3.435 
φC= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
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v(ABD))/24] = (6*21.04 + 2*21.04 + 2*21.04 + 2*21.04 + 2*21.04 + 2*19.53 + 
2*21.04 + 6*14.95)/24 = (336.64 + 39.06 + 89.7)/24 = 465.4/24 = 19.392 
φD= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(D) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABC))/24] = (6*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*17.76 + 
2*18.37 + 6*12.28)/24 = (293.92 + 33.72 + 73.68)/24 = 401.32/24 = 16.721 
 
d) v(C) = 18.3 Shapley value (23.522, 3.742, 17.463, 17.533) 
φA= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(BCD))/24] = (6*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 2*24.36 + 
2*24.36 + 6*21.01)/24 = (438.48 + 126.06)/24 = 564.54/24 = 23.522 
φB= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(CD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ACD))/24] = (6*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 2*4.58 + 
6*1.23)/24 = (82.44 + 7.38)/24 = 89.82/24 = 3.742 
φC= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(C) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(D) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AD) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BD) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABD))/24] = (6*18.3 + 2*18.3 + 2*18.3 + 2*18.3 + 2*18.3 + 2*18.3 + 2*18.3 + 
6*14.95)/24 = (329.4 + 89.7)/24 = 419.1/24 = 17.463 
φD= 1/4! Σ [(6*v(D) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(A) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(B) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(C) + 
2*v(ABCD)-v(AB) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(AC) + 2*v(ABCD)-v(BC) + 6*v(ABCD)-
v(ABC))/24] = (6*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 2*18.37 + 
2*18.37 + 6*15.02)/24 = (330.66 + 90.12)/24 = 420.78/24 = 17.533 
 
Now that we have calculated the new Shapley values of all players according to the 
change in consumption of player C, we can see how these changes relate to players ben-
efits (Figure 37). As C’s electricity consumption increases, the Shapley value decreases 
linearly. The other players’ value increases, although we can see that for the bigger 
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players the increasing is more than the small players (as noted in player B, where they 
increase their benefit only in the last case.) 
 
Figure 37 Shapley value of all players in the game and how it changes when player’s C electrici-
ty surplus changes 
Player D changes consumption 
First we denote how the change in consumption influences player’s D surplus of elec-
tricity (Table 12). Then we calculate the Shapley value of each player in the different 
scenarios. At the end we plot the different Shapley values on a graph to see the change 
in value, whether it increases or decreases according to increase/decrease of consump-
tion level. The calculations are the same as in the two examples before. 
Table 12 Change in D’s consumption leads to different possible benefits 
Monthly average consumption 
of player D 
Monthly average production 
of player D 
Surplus of player D’s electricity and 
possible benefits 
v(D) kWh v(D) Euro 
638.7 791.7 153 15.3 
669.2 791.7 122.5 12.25 
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699.6 791.7 92.1 9.21 
730 791.7 61.7 6.17 
 
Next we can calculate the Shapley value of each player. (since the calculations are the 
same only with different values, they are not presented for this part). 
a) v(D) = 15.3 Shapley value (21.589, 3.435, 24.708, 12.528) 
b) v(D) = 12.25 Shapley value (22.605, 3.435, 25.725, 10.495) 
c) v(D) = 9.21 Shapley value (23.517, 3.738, 26.637, 8.368) 
d) v(D) = 6.17 Shapley value (24.277, 4.498, 27.397, 6.088) 
Next we can plot the changed values to see the behavior when D’s surplus changes. 
From Figure 38 we can conclude that again as one players consumption increases, the 
values of other players decreases. 
 
 
Figure 38 Shapley value of all players in the game and how it changes when player’s D elec-
tricity surplus changes 
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4.1.3 Calculations using Shapley theorem when players sell ex-
cess electricity to the grid using different pricing schemes 
The amount of electricity that will be covering the needs of the consumers in the society 
is more than what is produced. This difference is the amount to be sold to the power grid 
which is Tp-Tc=125.3kWh. Instead of being wasted, the electricity is sold to the grid. We 
assume that different utilities offer different pricing schemes: flat price, linear price in-
crease, exponential price increase and linear price decrease. First we calculate which 
amount from this remaining electricity belongs to which player. We achieve this by sub-
tracting the total surplus of each player’s electricity v(N) with the electricity they sold to 
their neighboring consumers φN; v’(N)=v(N)-φN, A,B,C,D∈N.  
Shapley value (20.565, 3.435, 23.685, 14.575) 
v'(A)=v(A)-φA=243.6 – 205.65 = 37.95kWh 
v'(B)=v(B)-φB=45.8 – 34.35 = 11.45kWh 
v'(C)=v(C)-φC=274.8 – 236.85 = 37.95kWh 
v'(D)=v(D)-φD=183.7 – 145.75 = 37.95kWh 
 
After we have calculated what each player will be contributing to the game, we consider 
four cases of selling profiles, each with different pricing schemes: flat selling price, lin-
ear increase in price, exponential increase in price and linear decrease in price. In each 
case, except the first one, we divide the total amount in groups with different price, 
which increases/decreases after a certain amount of electricity, depending on the pricing 
model. For each group of pricing scheme we calculate the Shapley value for each play-
er, thus dividing the profits fairly among the players. We do this because if let say two 
players sell their electricity for price x and two players sell their electricity price for 
price y, and x>y, the first two players would unfairly benefit from the transaction. Hence 
the need for the fairness of the Shapley theorem to distribute benefits according to con-
tribution of each player. 
 
Case 1 – Flat selling price 
In this case, we have the same price as when selling in the grid (p=0.1 eur per kWh). 
The amount of electricity sold to the grid does not affect the price, so it doesn’t matter 
how much they will sell, the price will remain constant. This makes the prosumer equal-
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ly motivated to sell to the grid or to the community. And since the price is constant, 
each player receives benefits of φN = v*p where v is the value of a player and p is the 
price. 
Shapley value (3.795, 1.145, 3.795, 3.795) 
The players’ Shapley values are denoted in Table 13. 
Table 13 Shapley values of all players in euros 
Shapley value in euros v(A) v(B) v(C) v(D) 
Price (0.1) 3.795 1.145 3.795 3.795 
 
Case 2 – Linear increase of price 
This means the more they sell the price per kWh increases linearly. So if they sell 
50kWh they will get 0.1 eur per kWh, for the next 50 they will get 0.15 eur and so on. 
This is a more motivating scheme for the prosumers since they receive more as they sell 
more. In this case we calculate the Shapley value for each player in a given pricing 
scheme, and then multiply the value of the given price in set group. When we calculate 
the value in euros for each player in all groups, we sum to get the total value of each 
player. This is done so there will be a fair distribution of benefits to all players. The cal-
culations are done in a more simple way since they are the same as in the previous cas-
es, so there is no need for a step by step explanation. 
 
a) First 50kWh with a price of 0.1 eur per kWh 
Shapley value (3.795, 1.145, 3.795, 3.795) 
φA= φC= φD=(37.95*6 + 12.05*4 + 37.95*2 + 0.6*6 + 0*6)/24 = (303.6 + 48.2 + 3.6)/24 
=14.75 kWh=1.48eur 
φB=(11.45*6 + 11.45*6 + 0*12)/24 = 5.725kWh = 0.572 eur 
 
b) Second 50 kWh with price of 0.15 eur per kWh 
It is important to note that the values of each player decreases in each round of calcula-
tions. So now we take into account the values calculated by subtracting the total value of 
each player with the Shapley value calculated in the previous round of 50kWh sold 
v(A)=v(C)=v(D)=37.95-14.75=23.2kWh 
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v(B)=11.45-5.725=5.72kWh 
 
Shapley value (2.31,0.564,2.31,2.31) 
φA= φC= φD=(23.2*6 + 23.2*6 + 3.6*2 + 21.08*4 + 0*6)/24 = (278.4 + 7.2 + 84.52)/24 
= 15.41kWh = 2.31 eur 
φB=(5.72*6 + 5.72*6 + 3.6*6 + 0*6)/24 = (68.64 + 21.6)/24 = 3.76kWh = 0.564 eur 
 
c) Last 25.3 kWh with a price 0.2 eur per kWh 
 
v(A)=v(C)=v(D)=23.2-15.41=7.79kWh 
v(B)=5.72-3.76=1.96kWh 
 
Shapley value (1.558,0.392,1.558,1.558) 
φA= φC= φD=7.79kWh = 1.558 eur 
φB=1.96kWh = 0.392 eur 
We can see the final benefits that users receive after selling all their electricity in Table 
14. 
Table 14 Shapley value of players in a linear increase pricing scheme 
Shapley value in euros v(A) v(B) v(C) v(D) 
Price (0.1) 1.48 0.572 1.48 1.48 
Price (0.15) 2.31 0.564 2.31 2.31 
Price (0.2) 1.558 0.392 1.558 1.558 
Total 5.348 1.528 5.348 5.348 
 
Case 3 – Exponential price increase 
Another pricing scheme denotes that the more they sell, the price will grow exponential-
ly. If they sell 20 kWh they will be paid 0.05 eur per kWh, for the next 40 they will get 
0.1 eur, for the next 80 they will get 0.2 eur. This motivates prosumers to produce more 
and use less electricity so they can earn more by obtaining higher prices per kWh when 
they sell larger amounts to the grid. It also motivates them to sell more to the grid and 
less to the community. We make the same calculations as in the previous case, with the 
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difference of the amount of kWh in each group. Since this scheme allows prices to grow 
faster than in the previous case, the amount also increases rather than be equal. Another 
difference is the starting point of the price for the first pricing scheme, which is lower, 
thus giving benefits when there is a larger amount of electricity sold. 
 
a) First 20kWh with a price of 0.05 eur per kWh 
 
φA= φC= φD=(20*6 + 8.55*2 + 0*16)/24 = (120 + 17.1)/24 = 5.71kWh = 0.285eur 
φB=(11.45*6 + 0*18)/24 = 68.7/24 = 2.87kWh = 0.143 eur 
 
b) Second 40kWh with a price of 0.1 eur per kWh 
 
v(A)=v(C)=v(D)=37.95-5.71=32.24kWh 
v(B)=11.45-2.87=8.58 kWh 
 
φA= φC= φD=(32.24*6 + 7.76*4 + 31.42*2 + 0*12)/24 = (193.44 + 31.04 + 62.84)/24 = 
11.97 kWh = 1.197 eur 
φB=(8.58*6 + 7.76*6 + 0*12)/24 = (51.48 + 46.56)/24 = 4.09 kWh = 0.409 eur 
 
c) Last 65.3kWh with a price of 0.2 eur per kWh 
 
v(A)=v(C)=v(D)=32.24-11.97=20.27kWh=4.054 eur 
v(B)=8.58-4.09=4.49kWh=0.898 eur 
 
In Table 15 we denote the Shapley value of all players in each round, as well as their 
total benefits under the pricing scheme of this case. 
Table 15 Shapley value of players in an exponential increase pricing scheme 
Shapley value in euros v(A) v(B) v(C) v(D) 
Price 1(0.1) 0.285 0.143 0.285 0.285 
Price 2(0.15) 1.197 0.409 1.197 1.197 
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Price 3(0.20 4.054 0.898 4.054 4.054 
Total 5.536 1.45 5.536 5.536 
 
Case 4 – Linear decrease of prices 
This pricing scheme lowers the price per kWh as the amount of sold electricity decreas-
es. So the first 60kWh will be with a price of 0.2 eur per kWh, the next 40kWh will be 
with 0.15 eur per kWh, and for the last 0.1 eur per kWh, when the price is flat. This 
makes them more motivated to sell to the community than to the grid. The difference in 
this case compared to the linear increase of prices case is that the first 50kWh are sold 
for a higher price than in case 2, thus making this pricing scheme more profitable. If the 
amount of electricity is inversely divided from the one in case 2, we would get the same 
division of benefits. Table 16 at the end denotes all players Shapley values and a final 
sum of benefits. 
 
a) First 50kWh with a price of 0.2 eur per kWh 
 
φA= φC= φD=(37.95*6 + 12.05*4 + 37.95*2 + 0.6*6 + 0*6)/24 = (303.6 + 48.2 + 3.6)/24 
= 14.75 kwh = 2.95eur 
φB=(11.45*6 + 11.45*6 + 0*12)/24 = 5.725kWh = 1.145 eur 
 
b) Second 50 kWh with 0.15 eur per kWh price 
 
v(A)=v(C)=v(D)=37.95-14.75=23.2kWh 
v(B)=11.45-5.725=5.72kWh 
 
φA= φC= φD=(23.2*6 + 23.2*6 + 3.6*2 + 21.08*4 + 0*6)/24 = (278.4 + 7.2 + 84.52)/24 
= 15.41kWh = 2.31 eur 
φB=(5.72*6 + 5.72*6 + 3.6*6 + 0*6)/24 = (68.64 + 21.6)/24 = 3.76kWh = 0.564 eur 
 
c) Last 25.3 kWh with 0.1 eur per kWh price 
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v(A)=v(C)=v(D)=23.2-15.41=7.79kWh 
v(B)=5.72-3.76=1.96kWh 
 
φA= φC= φD=7.79kWh = 0.779 eur 
φB=1.96kWh=0.196 eur 
 
Table 16 Shapley value of players in a linear decrease pricing scheme 
Shapley value in euros v(A) v(B) v(C) v(D) 
Price 1 2.95 1.145 2.95 2.95 
Price 2 2.31 0.564 2.31 2.31 
Price 3 0.779 0.196 0.779 0.779 
Total 6.039 1.905 6.039 6.039 
 
Results 
Now we can compare the benefits each player incurs from different pricing schemes, as 
presented in Table 17. From the table we can conclude that the last case, i.e. the case of 
linear decrease of the price gives the highest benefits. But as stated before, this depends 
on the division of amount of electricity per group of different prices. In the case if the 
amount is divided inversely in linear decrease from the case of linear increase of prices, 
the highest value each user will receive would be in the third case. This is understanda-
ble since the model is made to motivate users to sell more to receive more benefits. All 
of these 3 cases deliver more benefits to users than the case with flat pricing scheme. 
 
Table 17 Compared Shapley values of all players in all four cases of pricing scheme 
Shapley value in euros v(A) v(B) v(C) v(D) Total 
Case 1 3.795 1.145 3.795 3.795 12.53 
Case 2 5.348 1.528 5.348 5.348 17.572 
Case 3 5.536 1.45 5.536 5.536 18.058 
Case 4 6.039 1.905 6.039 6.039 20.022 
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5 Conclusions 
As the need for using renewable resources for producing electricity increases, there will 
be more and more issues arising. One of them is the electricity sharing among small dis-
tributed generators, such as houses, the distribution of this electricity and motivation of 
users to produce it. 
In this dissertation we have addressed the problem of electricity sharing among prosum-
ers (electricity producing consumers) in a small community. The issue of fair distribu-
tion of benefits among the players is solved by the proposed Shapley theorem algorithm. 
We have developed the algorithm taking into consideration the possible consumption 
patterns, the main source of electricity generation in the chosen area, i.e. sun exposure 
as well as the solar panel capacity difference and how the combination of the three ac-
counts for the surplus/deficit of electricity each community member will have. We have 
considered 10 members of a community, where only 6 of them have a surplus of elec-
tricity. The model we developed, allows them to sell electricity at a specific price to the 
remaining 4, while sharing benefits from their collaboration in a fair way according to 
their contribution. Three of the producing users are considered as one player, since they 
have the same amount of surplus, and by acting as one, have a higher share in the coali-
tion, thus expect higher benefits, a notion explained later in our findings. The total bene-
fits of the coalition are 62.26 eur, considering a price of 0.1 eur per kWh. Next we con-
sider what happens to each players’ benefits when we change the consumption level of 
one player, while the other’s consumption stays the same. As expected there is an in-
crease of payments to the players with constant consumption, when the variable con-
sumption of one player increases. This proves the notion of the Shapley theorem, that 
players with higher contribution receive the highest benefits. 
Since the total surplus of electricity is more than needed in the community, we devel-
oped a model to sell the surplus of electricity to the grid according to specific pricing 
schemes. The total amount (125.3kWh) is sold by using one of the four pricing schemes: 
flat prices, linear increase, exponential increase and linear decrease of price. The elec-
tricity is sold in lots (except for the first scheme), with different prices that change ac-
cording to the pricing scheme, and profits are shared fairly among all players. The pric-
ing scheme of linear price decrease (see Table 18) turns to be the most profitable ac-
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cording to our electricity lot division, which is the main variable that influences the re-
sults the most. By using different division of lots, the results would be different. 
Table 18 Compared results from different pricing schemes 
Shapley value in euros v(A) v(B) v(C) v(D) Total 
Flat price 3.795 1.145 3.795 3.795 12.53 
Linear increase 5.348 1.528 5.348 5.348 17.572 
Exponential increase 5.536 1.45 5.536 5.536 18.058 
Linear decrease 6.039 1.905 6.039 6.039 20.022 
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